Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a middle school student, was brought to school by his mother. He was wearing a hoodie over his head because he was embarrassed of his haircut. When Plaintiff’s mother told him to pull down the hoodie, Plaintiff got upset and a school employee called Defendant, the school resource officer. Defendant spoke with Plaintiff for two minutes before pushing him to the ground, pinning him down, and then pushing him in the back as he walked away. Defendant entered a guilty plea to a criminal battery charge.In this civil case, the district court entered summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on each of Plaintiff’s claims, finding he was entitled to qualified immunity. However, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed as to the excessive force and battery claims, finding that the force used by Defendant was excessive and that a reasonable jury could find that Defendant acted maliciously. View "Trellus Richmond v. Mario J. Badia" on Justia Law

The appeal involves the tax consequences of Petitioners' participation in a complex tax avoidance scheme. Petitioners expected to realize an $80.9 million capital gain as a result of selling a portion of his company. The scheme, which involved a set of tiered partnerships, allowed Petitioners to claim a $77.6 million artificial loss to offset his legitimate capital gains. A federal district court found the scheme to be an abusive tax shelter and upheld the IRS’s disallowance of the benefits of the shelter in a partnership-level proceeding, and a prior panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. As a result of the partnership-level proceeding, the IRS issued a notice of deficiency to Petitioners disallowing the $77.6 million loss deduction they reported on their joint tax return. Petitioners sought review in the U.S. Tax Court, which rejected their various challenges.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (“TEFRA”), the governing scheme in effect during the relevant period, established uniform audit and litigation procedures for the resolution of partnership tax items. The filing of the final partnership administrative adjustment (FPAA), the timeliness of which Petitioners do not contest, suspended the limitations period for assessment of tax attributable to affected items until January 11, 2017. The 2016 notice asserts a deficiency that is attributable to an affected item. Accordingly, the statute of limitations had not expired when the IRS issued the September 9, 2016 notice of deficiency, as the Tax Court correctly found. View "Raghunathan Sarma, et al v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

A federal district court decision in a declaratory judgment action that an insurance policy issued by Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London (“Underwriters”) covered certain negligent actions undertaken by the former directors and officers of Omni National Bank (“Omni”) during the 2008 banking crisis. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), acting in Omni’s name as Omni’s receiver, demanded payment and prejudgment interest from Underwriters under the insurance policy for a stipulated judgment previously entered against three of Omni’s former directors and officers for $10 million, the limit of Underwriters’ insurance policy. Underwriters paid the $10 million once the Supreme Court denied certiorari for its appeal from the declaratory judgment but refused to pay prejudgment interest, causing the FDIC to institute this action.   On appeal, the FDIC argues that demands for prejudgment interest are timely under Georgia law so long as they are made before the entry of a coercive final judgment, which declaratory judgments are not. The Eleventh Circuit agreed, concluding that the district court erred by granting summary judgment for Underwriters. Accordingly, the court remanded for the determination of when prejudgment interest began to run.   The court explained that Underwriters’ argument that it lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of prejudgment interest, as Section 9–11–54(c)(1) requires, is false on its face. This entire lawsuit has been dedicated to extensively litigating prejudgment interest. Further, the court held that FDIC’s claim is not barred. View "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Colombian native, was arrested in Colombia on drug trafficking charges and ultimately convicted in federal court. Petitioner now appeals the denial of both his amended 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate his convictions and sentence and his subsequent motion to alter or amend the judgment. He claims that one of his pre-extradition attorneys was ineffective due to a conflict of interest. According to Petitioner, his attorney tried to convince him to pay a thirty-million-dollar bribe or kickback as part of a plea agreement, which would redound to the benefit of one of Petitioner’s other clients. But Petitioner was represented by other attorneys, and he does not allege that they were conflicted or otherwise deficient in pursuing legitimate plea agreements on Petitioner’s behalf. The district court held that the allegations in Petitioner’s motion would not establish a Sixth Amendment violation even if true.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even assuming a conflict of interest existed, Petitioner’s claim ultimately fails because he does not sufficiently allege that the “conflict adversely affected his representation.” Although Petitioner criticizes his attorney, he does not allege that his other attorneys suffered under a conflict of interest. The Sixth Amendment ensures the right to effective assistance of “an attorney.” The Sixth Amendment does not include the right to receive good advice from every lawyer a criminal defendant consults about his case. Further, the court wrote, that because it concluded that Petitioner’s claim fails on the merits, it cannot say the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. View "Fabio Ochoa v. USA" on Justia Law

The former Speaker of the House of the Alabama Legislature was the target of a grand jury investigation in Lee County, Alabama. He was accused of misusing his office for personal gain, including by funneling money into his printing business. Plaintiff was a state representative at the time of the investigation into Speaker Hubbard. Plaintiff believed that he had evidence undermining the accusations against the speaker and contacted the defense team to help them.   Plaintiff sued the Attorney General of Alabama in federal court. His complaint brought First Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The relevant issues on appeal are: Does Alabama’s grand jury secrecy law prohibit a grand jury witness from divulging information he learned before he testified to the grand jury, and if so, does the secrecy law violate the First Amendment? And does the Alabama grand jury secrecy law’s prohibition on a witness disclosing grand jury information he learned “only by virtue of being made a witness” violate his First Amendment free speech rights?   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed, in part, and remanded. The court concluded that Alabama’s grand jury secrecy law, unlike the Florida law in Butterworth, cannot reasonably be read to prohibit a grand jury witness from divulging information he learned before he testified to the grand jury. The court also concluded that the grand jury secrecy law’s prohibition on a witness’s disclosure of grand jury information that he learned only by virtue of being made a witness does not violate the Free Speech Clause. View "William E. Henry v. Attorney General, State of Alabama" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the denial of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. After receiving a notice to appear that initiated his removal proceedings and advised him of his obligation to keep his address up-to-date with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Petitioner moved and did not send the agency his new address. The immigration court later sent Petitioner a notice informing him of the time and place of his removal hearing. Since he had moved, Petitioner did not receive that notice. He then failed to show up at his removal hearing and was ordered removed in absentia. Petitioner asserts that he was improperly ordered removed in absentia because he did not receive the notice of his removal hearing the agency was required to provide under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).   The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that once he received a notice to appear warning him of his obligation to update the agency when he changed addresses, Petitioner was on the hook to follow through with that instruction. Because he failed to keep DHS apprised of his whereabouts, the INA allowed for Petitioner’s removal in absentia even though he never received the later notice informing him of his removal hearing’s time and place. Thus, the court wrote that Petitioner’s removal order complied with the statute’s requirements. View "Andrei Dragomirescu v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner participated in several shootings as a member of MS-13, a violent gang. He was convicted of one count of conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). He was also convicted of four counts under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Act (VICAR), 18 U.S.C. Section 1959(a). Because he used a gun in committing those offenses, he was also convicted of four corresponding counts of using a firearm in relation to each “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). For these nine convictions, he is serving three concurrent life sentences plus eighty-five years. His eighty-five-year sentence is based exclusively on the four firearms convictions.   Petitioner filed a 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate his firearms convictions and his eighty-five-year sentence. The district court denied the motion. At issue on appeal is whether his four firearms convictions are unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, 588 U.S.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court. The court held that Petitioner’s VICAR convictions (Counts Two, Four, Eight, and Ten), predicated on his commission of murder and attempted murder, qualify as crimes of violence under Section 924(c)’s elements clause. That means that his corresponding firearms convictions (Counts Three, Five, Nine, and Eleven) are still valid after Davis’s holding that the residual clause is unconstitutional. And that means that, after Petitioner completes his three concurrent life sentences, he will still have a consecutive eighty-five-year sentence left to serve. View "Miguel Alvarado-Linares v. USA" on Justia Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated an enforcement action against several entities and individuals. The district court granted the unopposed motion and appointed Appellee as receiver, authorizing him to “take custody, control, and possession of all Receivership Entity records, documents, and materials” and to “take any other action as necessary and appropriate for the preservation of the Receivership Entities’ property interests.” Defendants didn’t appeal the order appointing Appellee as receiver. The district court granted the motion. Defendants appealed, contending that they weren’t afforded an adequate opportunity to be heard before the receivership estate’s expansion. Appellee has moved to dismiss Defendants’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction.The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. The court found that neither Section 1292(a)(2) nor Section 1292(a)(1) grants the court jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the expansion order was neither an order appointing a receiver nor an order granting (or modifying) an injunction. The court explained that to the extent that the appointment of the receiver or the expansion of his duties could be viewed as an injunction at all, the district court possessed freestanding authority to enter it. Given that the district court had both statutory and residual equitable authority to establish and expand the receivership, it had no cause to invoke the All Writs Act to aid its jurisdiction. View "Securities & Exchange Commission v. L.M.E. 2017 Family Trust, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was taken hostage by a fleeing felon in rural Georgia. At the felon’s behest Plaintiff drove the truck toward seven officers gathered at the scene and showed no signs of stopping. As the logging truck struck the police vehicles lining the dirt road, several of the officers opened fire on the cab of the truck, even though they allegedly knew Plaintiff -- an innocent hostage -- was being forced to drive.   Plaintiff survived but was shot in his hand, his fingers, his hip, and his shoulder. He sued both Georgia State Patrol Lieutenants in their individual capacities (collectively, “Defendants”) for violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. The Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment because their actions were reasonable and, even if they were not, they did not violate any clearly established law.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the fleeing felon put Plaintiff, Defendants, and the public in grave and imminent danger. Police officers like Defendants may use deadly force to dispel a threat (and, here, an imminent one) of serious physical harm or death or to prevent the escape of a very dangerous suspect who threatens that harm. Defendants made the difficult, but altogether reasonable, a decision that the fleeing felon and the logging truck had to be stopped -- and, tragically, that meant stopping Plaintiff, too. View "Paul Donald Davis, et al. v. Paul Waller, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a commercial photographer, discovered infringing uses of his copyrighted images on the internet. Instead of pursuing the infringing parties, Plaintiff brought a lawsuit against Ice Portal, Inc. – now a division of Shiji (US), Inc. (“Shiji”) – which acts as an intermediary between the hotels that licensed Plaintiff’s photographs and online travel agents (“OTAs”) like Expedia and Travelocity.In optimizing the photographs for use by the OTAs, Shiji’s software allegedly removed certain copyright-related information that Plaintiff had embedded within the metadata of the photographs. Defendant claimed that Shiji, therefore, violated the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).   The district court correctly granted summary judgment to Shiji because Plaintiff did not show an essential element of its claim – namely, that Shiji knew, or had reasonable grounds to know, that its actions would induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal a copyright infringement. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Plaintiff did not meet its burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence demonstrating Section 1202(b)’s second scienter requirement, and judgment in Shiji’s favor was therefore appropriate. The court explained that the statute’s plain language requires some identifiable connection between the defendant’s actions and the infringement or the likelihood of infringement. To hold otherwise would create a standard under which the defendant would always know that its actions would “induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal” infringement because distributing protected images wrongly cleansed of CMI would always make infringement easier in some general sense. View "Victor Elias Photography, LLC v. Ice Portal, Inc." on Justia Law