Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In Defendant’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”), the probation officer determined that Jackson’s prior criminal history qualified him for an Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) sentencing enhancement. ACCA applies to a conviction under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g) for firearm possession by a prohibited person if the defendant has three qualifying convictions for “a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e)(1). Based on that conclusion, it sentenced Defendant to ACCA’s mandated fifteen-year minimum.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence. The court held that due-process fair-notice considerations require the court to apply the Controlled Substance Act Schedules in place when Defendant committed the offense for which he is being sentenced. At the times of Defendant’s cocaine-related prior offenses for which he sustained convictions under Fla. Stat. Section 893.13, the cocaine-related activity Section 893.13 criminalized categorically included activity involving ioflupane. Further, At the times of Defendant's prior cocaine-related state convictions, Fla. Stat. Section 893.13(a)(1)’s controlled-substance element was broader for cocaine-related offenses than ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition, so Defendant’s 1998 and 2004 cocaine-related convictions do not qualify as “serious drug offense[s].” The two Smith cases, Shular, and McNeill do not require the conclusion that Defendant’s prior cocaine-related convictions qualify as “serious drug offense[s].” Thus, because Defendant’s cocaine-related Section 893.13 offenses do not qualify as “serious drug offenses” under ACCA, the court vacated his sentence and remanded to the district court for sentencing without the ACCA enhancement. View "USA v. Eugene Jackson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a claim against Miami-Dade County under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). Plaintiff claimed she was a county employee and that the County abused the Program to save labor costs; the County argued that Plaintiff was never a county employee. As part of cross-motions, the parties stipulated that Plaintiff’s participation in the Program “solely to acquire “training in forensic photography.” The District Court determined that Plaintiff was an intern, not an employee, using the primary beneficiary test adopted by the Eleventh Circuit.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court first explained that Plaintiff does not qualify as a volunteer under the volunteer exception. Further, under the internship exception, an intern learning under an employer is not considered “employed” by the FLSA so long as the intern is the primary beneficiary of the relationship. To determine who the primary beneficiary of an intern-employer relationship is, the court looks to seven non-exhaustive factors.   Here, the facts show that Plaintiff learned forensic photography from a highly regarded county program for free and over a six-month period. And in participating in the Program, Plaintiff clearly understood that she would not be paid and that she was not entitled to a job with Miami-Dade County following her internship.  Further, Plaintiff gained both valuable practical experience and training from forensic photography professionals and Program assignments throughout the entirety of her participation. Likewise, the County’s receipt of some benefit from Plaintiff’s internship under the sixth factor does not transform the County into the primary beneficiary of its relationship with Plaintiff. View "Brandi McKay v. Miami-Dade County" on Justia Law

The appeals at issue involve two conceptually different causes of action against separate Defendants. These claims were pled together and tried to a jury empaneled for each claim. In one claim, Plaintiff, an at-will employee of a sheriff’s office, sued the sheriff, alleging that he made false and stigmatizing statements in terminating her employment that deprived her of a liberty interest in her reputation without affording her a post-termination hearing to clear her name in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the other claim, Plaintiff alleged that a sheriff’s office co-employee, whom she supervised, defamed her in violation of state tort law. The jury found for Plaintiff on both claims. Defendants’ appealed the judgments entered pursuant to the jury’s verdicts in No. 18-14808. In No. 19-13269, the sheriff appealed the judgment awarding Plaintiff an attorney’s fee on the claim brought against him.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment in No. 18-14808 and vacated and remand for further proceedings the judgment for attorney’s fee in No. 19-13269. The court held that because the defamation claim and the due process claim are unrelated, it was an error for the district court to consider the hours expended on the defamation claim in determining the lodestar. The court explained that Plaintiff had the burden of establishing the hours her attorneys spent in preparing for and prosecuting her due process claim against the Sheriff. Thus on remand, the district court must hold Plaintiff to her burden of proof so that it can identify the non-compensable hours and adjust the lodestar accordingly. View "Jacquelyn Johnston v. Gary S. Borders, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs—five organizations and two individual voters from Gwinnett County, Georgia—alleged that absentee ballot applications and voting-related information should have been, but were not, provided in both English and Spanish to voters in Gwinnett County during the 2020 election cycle. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit was tasked with determining whether Defendants—the Gwinnett County Board of Registrations and Elections, the Board’s individual members, and Georgia Secretary of State—violated Section 203 and Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. Section 10503, requires certain States and their political subdivisions to provide voting materials in languages in addition to English.The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing. Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded standing under a diversion of resources theory, and while some of Plaintiffs’ claims were moot, others remained live and amenable to meaningful relief from the court. The court, therefore, vacated the district court’s dismissal of the suit pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).The court held that the district court was correct, however, in concluding that Plaintiffs failed to state causes of action under either Section 203 or Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act and in not granting Plaintiffs leave to file their proposed supplemental complaint. The court, therefore, affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the suit pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and its denial of leave for Plaintiffs to file the supplemental complaint pursuant to Rule 15(d). View "Georgia Association of Latino Elected Officials, Inc., et al. v. Gwinnett County Board of Registration and Elections, et al." on Justia Law

After being stopped for driving without a license, removal proceedings were initiated against Petitioner. In response, Petitioner applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b which the Immigration Judge denied. Petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which “affirm[ed] the Immigration Judge’s decision on the ground that the respondent ha[d] not established that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives.”   Petitioner appealed on two separate but interrelated grounds: 1) that the BIA committed legal error in applying the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard and 2) that the BIA failed to render a reasoned decision. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition seeking cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b. The court held there was no legal or constitutional error in the decision of the BIA.   The court explained that because it cannot disturb factual findings, it is left to see if Petitioner identified any legal error with respect to the application of the law to those facts established in the BIA’s decision. The court found that Petitioner has not identified one. Turning to the second argument after reviewing the BIA’s opinion and Petitioner’s argument, the court did not see a legal argument for which it would have jurisdiction to review. As long as the BIA cites and proceeds to apply the proper legal standard, as it did in this case, the court cannot make legal error out of an inherently subjective determination of whether an applicant’s relatives will experience exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. View "Esteban Flores-Alonso v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Plaintiff retained an attorney of the Advocacy Law Firm to sue Defendants for alleged ADA violations following Plaintiff’s visit to Defendants’ place of business. The attorney has filed hundreds of lawsuits under the ADA on behalf of Plaintiff and others. As the prevailing party, Plaintiff  moved for attorney’s fees.. While the district court found that Plaintiff was entitled to attorney’s fees, the district court determined that the requested amount was grossly disproportionate given the case’s circumstances. The district court therefore reduced the requested fees.   Plaintiff argued that the district court abused its discretion in reducing the amount he requested for attorney’s fees.  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the award, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the attorney billed an excessive number of hours given the complexity of the case. The court noted that the attorney has been involved in hundreds of ADA lawsuits, including 140 during the case. Additionally, the district court found that the pleadings and motions filed here were “boilerplate” and much like filings in the attorney’s other ADA cases.   Further, the record reflects that the attorney was unduly litigious and engaged in unnecessary motion practice. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the attorney unnecessarily prolonged the litigation which, in turn, unnecessarily increased the amount of attorney’s fees. View "Howard Michael Caplan v. All American Auto Collision, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Dukes Clothing, LLC (“Dukes”) operated two clothing stores. As a result of the state orders and a customer’s exposure to COVID-19, Dukes was forced to close its doors. These closures resulted in lost business income for Dukes. Dukes’s insurer, The Cincinnati Insurance Company (“Cincinnati”), had issued an all-risk commercial insurance policy to Dukes. Dukes submitted a claim under its policy to recover its loss of business income due to its store closures caused by COVID-19. Cincinnati denied the claim on the basis that Dukes’s income loss was not caused by a direct physical loss or damage to the insured’s property.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims holding that Plaintiff’s income loss was not caused by a direct physical loss or damage to the insured’s property. The court explained that when examining insurance policies, Alabama courts consider the language of the policy as a whole, not in isolation. There are no Alabama appellate court decisions interpreting the relevant terms here—physical loss or damage—or interpreting these types of all-risk policies in the COVID-19 context so the court looked to its’ decisions interpreting nearly identical terms under Florida and Georgia law. Ultimately, the court found that since COVID-19 does not cause a “tangible alteration of the property” such that the property could not be used in the future or needed repairs to be used, lost business income resulting from COVID-19 could not constitute a “physical loss of or damage to” the property necessary for insurance coverage. View "Dukes Clothing, LLC v. The Cincinnati Insurance Company" on Justia Law

When the first Covid-19 cases appeared in Georgia, the governor declared a public state of emergency. Plaintiff’s restaurant played its part by suspending dine-in service. To recover the income, it was losing by closing its doors, Plaintiff quickly filed a claim with its insurer, Allied Insurance Company of America. Under Plaintiff’s “Premier Businessowners Property Coverage” policy, Allied agreed to “pay for direct physical loss of or damage to Covered Property” if it was “caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause of Loss.”   Allied denied coverage. It found that Plaintiff’s closure was not caused by any “direct physical loss or damage.” And under the policy’s Virus or Bacteria exclusion, Allied refused to “pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly” by any “virus.” The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. It held that no “direct physical loss of or damage to” property occurred because the restaurant and its dining room “underwent no physical change.”   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that the harm does not extend to the intangible harm caused by Covid-19 or by a declaration of public emergency issued in its wake. Plaintiff alleged no actual change to its property. Even if the court assumed that the governor’s Covid-19 order caused loss because it deprived the restaurant of the use of its property, that does not result in a win for Plainitff. Allied agreed to provide for only one manner of loss—the physical loss of Henry’s property and to be physical it must be “tangible or concrete.” View "Henry's Louisiana Grill, Inc., et al v. Allied Insurance Company of America" on Justia Law

Following a guilty plea, Defendant objected to the presentence investigation report (“PSI”) arguing that pursuant to Section 2M5.2(a)(2), his base offense level should have been 14 rather than 26 because the weapons parts that were seized could be converted to only two functional weapons.   Interpreting U.S.S.G. Section 2M5.2(a)(2), the Eleventh Circuit explained that the subsection sets a lower base offense level for defendants convicted of illegally exporting weapons if the offense involved only non-fully automatic small arms and there were no more than two weapons. The question here is whether a defendant who exports enough weapons parts for two operable firearms, along with additional parts to service additional firearms, can take advantage of the lower base offense level.   The court affirmed Defendant’s sentence, finding that the district court applied the correct base offense level because Defendant’s offense did not fit within the narrow carveout set forth in Section 2M5.2(a)(2)(A); and the court lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s discretionary decision not to depart downward from the Guidelines. View "USA v. Christopher Daniel Stines" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action lawsuit against brokerage firm Hornor, Townsend & Kent (“HTK”) and its parent company The Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company. The complaint alleged that HTK breached its fiduciary duties under Georgia law and that Penn Mutual aided and abetted that breach. The district court concluded that the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”) barred Plaintiff from using a class action to bring those state law claims.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court explained that SLUSA’s bar applies when “(1) the suit is a ‘covered class action,’ (2) the plaintiffs’ claims are based on state law, (3) one or more ‘covered securities’ has been purchased or sold, and (4) the defendant [allegedly] misrepresented or omitted a material fact ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of such security.’”Here, the only disputed issue is whether Plaintiff’s complaint alleges a misrepresentation or omission. The court reasoned that the district court correctly dismissed the actions because the complaint alleges “an untrue statement or omission of material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security." View "Jeffrey A. Cochran v. The Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, et al" on Justia Law