Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An anonymous complaint led to Plaintiff’s arrest and trial on charges of aggravated animal cruelty, battery on an officer, and resisting arrest. After a jury acquitted Plaintiff, he sued the officers who arrested him. At issue on appeal was whether those officers are immune from suit under Florida law.   The Eleventh Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the officers’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court further reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions for the district court to enter summary judgment, based on sovereign immunity under Fla. Stat. Section 768.28(9)(a), in favor of the officers Officers on Plaintiff’s claims.   The court explained that the district court erred in this case when it applied the legal malice standard — instead of the actual malice standard — and determined that an arrest without probable cause by itself establishes that the officers acted with malice for purposes of Section 768.28(9)(a). Thus, because the district court applied the wrong standard, the district court didn’t do what is required, which is to analyze if each officer’s actions created a fact question about whether he was entitled to immunity from each state law claim against him.   The court addressed the immunity issues now instead of remanding the case for the district court to do so. In doing so the court held that no reasonable jury could find that any of the officers acted with actual malice or with wanton and willful disregard in arresting Plaintiff, even if they lacked probable cause to arrest him. View "Aaron Coleman v. John Riccardo, et al." on Justia Law

Técnicas Reunidas de Talara S.A.C., a Peruvian corporation, subcontracted with SSK Ingeniería y Construcción S.A.C., another Peruvian corporation, to provide electromechanical work on the refinery project. In response to a contract dispute, the arbitral panel issued a $40 million award to SSK. During the arbitration, two of Técnicas's attorneys withdrew and joined the opposing party’s law firm. More than a month later Técnicas objected in the International Court of Arbitration to alleged conflicts of interest held by the arbitrators, but its objection made no mention of the attorney side switching.   The district court agreed with Técnicas that a public policy against attorney side-switching exists in the United States but concluded that the public policy was not contravened in this case because there was no actual prejudice and Técnicas waived its objection. At issue on appeal concerns whether a party to an international arbitration can obtain a vacatur of an adverse arbitral award because two of its attorneys withdrew and joined the opposing party’s law firm during the arbitral proceedings.     The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment. The court explained that Técnicas waived its right to complain. The court explained thatTécnicas, the losing party in the arbitration, had knowledge of the attorney side-switching but did not object until Técnicas received an adverse award more than a year later, The court wrote that its conclusion is consistent with the well-settled principle “that a party may not sit idle through an arbitration procedure and then collaterally attack that procedure on grounds not raised . . . when the result turns out to be adverse.” View "Tecnicas Reunidas De Talara S.A.C. v. SSK Ingenieria Y Construccion S.A.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff received MemoryGel Silicone Gel Breast Implants made by Mentor Worldwide, LLC. After one of her implants ruptured, she sued Mentor pro se, alleging negligence and negligence per se, strict liability failure to warn, and strict liability manufacturing defect. The district court dismissed her complaint without prejudice and later dismissed her amended complaint with prejudice as preempted and foreclosed by Florida law.   Plaintiff appealed the district court’s dismissal of the manufacturing defect claims in Counts I and III of her initial complaint. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and held that Plaintiff’s manufacturing defect claims are sufficiently pleaded to survive a motion to dismiss.   The court explained that construing her pro se pleadings liberally, Plaintiff’s manufacturing defect claims are sufficiently pleaded to survive Mentor’s motion to dismiss. She plausibly alleged that Mentor violated a duty it owed to her, not the government. Specifically, she alleged that the implants’ manufacturing process differed from the specifications agreed to by the FDA and that Mentor used materials that differed from those approved by the FDA, violating both state law and the device-specific regulatory controls the FDA approved under 21 C.F.R. Section 820.30. These allegations are enough to state a plausible claim against Mentor under Rule 12(b)(6), and the district court erred by holding otherwise. View "Lalitha E. Jacob, MD v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC" on Justia Law

Georgia enacted the Living Infants Fairness and Equality (LIFE) Act in 2019. 2019 Ga. Laws Act 234 (H.B. 481). A group of abortion-rights advocacy groups, providers, and practitioners filed a two-count complaint naming as defendants multiple state officials in their official capacities. The abortionists’ first count alleged that the Act’s prohibition on post-fetal-heartbeat abortions violated women’s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See H.B. 481 Section 4. The abortionists’ second count alleged that the definition of “[n]atural person” in section 3 of the Act, see id. Section 3, is unconstitutionally vague on its face. The abortionists’ complaint requested preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining the enforcement of the Act, a declaratory judgment that the Act violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and attorney’s fees.   The district court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the state officials from enforcing the Act and declared that sections 3 and 4 of the Act violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction and reversed the judgment, holding that the prohibition of abortion after fetal heartbeat in the Act is subject only to rational basis review and that abortion prohibitions survive rational basis review. Further, the court held that the definition of natural person is not facially void for vagueness. View "SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective, et al. v. Governor of the State of Georgia, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners filed for rehearing in Robert W. Otto, et al. v. City of Boca Raton, Florida, et al. The Eleventh Circuit requested a poll on whether this case should be reheard by the court sitting en banc. A majority of the judges in active service on the court voted against granting rehearing en banc. Thus, the court ordered that this case will not be reheard en banc. View "Robert W. Otto, et al. v. City of Boca Raton, Florida, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner along with his mother, little sister, and two young cousins—crawled under a border fence that separated Mexico from Arizona. The United States Border Patrol agents soon apprehended them walking north along a highway and subsequently handed Petitioner a notice to appear. The notice ordered him to appear for removal proceedings before the Phoenix Immigration Court at a date and time “to be set.”   The Atlanta Immigration Court sent that notice to Petitioner at the most recent address they had on file for him—his aunt’s home in Rock Springs. It was returned, undelivered, to the immigration court. He remained in the United States for nearly a decade and a half before reappearing in the immigration system in July 2019, when he moved to reopen his removal proceedings. An immigration judge denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed that judgment and Petitioner argued that under Pereira he could not be removed.   The Eleventh Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition. The court explained an alien is eligible for a second chance at removal proceedings if he never received the notice telling him to attend the hearing he missed. But Petitioner cannot benefit from dodging a hearing or failing to keep the government informed of his current address. Petitioner did not tell the government when he moved, and he let his removal proceedings lie dormant for nearly fifteen years. A flaw in the initial notice handed to him does not entitle him, years later, to another chance at avoiding removal. View "Samuel Dacostagomez-Aguilar v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC) and related parties under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 2333. They based their claims on the FARC’s commission of offenses like kidnapping and murder in Colombia.   Plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against Defendants and based on their submissions the district court awarded them significant damages. After obtaining that judgment, Plaintiffs sought to attach the assets of third parties blocked by the Office of Foreign Assets Control. The final judgment entered by the clerk described the monetary awards to each of the plaintiffs (including the trebled portions) as “compensatory damages.”   Plaintiffs instituted garnishment proceedings in district court to attach the assets of Defendant and several limited liability companies he owns or controls. Plaintiffs filed a motion, in this case, asking the district court to amend the final judgment by removing the references to “compensatory damages.” They argued that the clerk of court erred in characterizing the trebled amounts of the awards as “compensatory damages” when the court itself had not described them in that way.   The district court denied the Rule 60(a) motion in a written order. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial. The court explained that Rule 60(a) provides that a court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other parts of the record. Here, the court saw no abuse of discretion (or clear error) when the district court found that the intent was for the entire $318 million to be deemed compensatory. View "Keith Stansell, et al v. Samark Jose Lopez Bello, et al" on Justia Law

An assistant district attorney (the “DA”) in Fulton County, Georgia obtained a material witness warrant requiring Plaintiff to appear as a witness at trial. Plaintiff voluntarily appeared at trial, making execution of the warrant unnecessary. After the trial ended, the DA failed to inform the trial judge that the warrant needed to be recalled. A few months later, a police officer arrested Plaintiff and placed him in jail because of the outstanding warrant. A judge eventually ordered Plaintiff’s release.   Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action alleging, among other things, that the DA’s failure to initiate the warrant’s cancelation violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The DA moved to dismiss the suit arguing that as a prosecutor she was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. The district court agreed and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against her.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that absolute prosecutorial immunity does not extend to DA’s failure to take action to cancel the warrant. The district court thus erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint.   The court wrote that determining whether prosecutorial immunity applies requires the court to take a fact-specific functional approach. Here, the court found that applying Third Circuit precedent from Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2008), results in the conclusion that the DA is not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. Thus the DA has failed to show that absolute immunity protects her post-trial conduct here. View "Kidanemariam Kassa v. Antionette Stephenson" on Justia Law

Various actors in the Medicare Advantage program assigned claims for failure to pay or reimburse medical expenses owed under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act to Plaintiffs—MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC; MSPA Claims 1, LLC; and MAO-MSO Recovery II LLC, Series PMPI, (collectively, “MSP Recovery”). MSP Recovery then asserted those claims against Metropolitan General Insurance Company, Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company, Metropolitan Group Property & Casualty Insurance Company, Metlife Auto & Home Group, and Metropolitan P&C Insurance Company (collectively, “Defendants”).   The district court dismissed MSP Recovery’s claims because the complaint failed to show that Defendants had a “demonstrated responsibility” to reimburse MSP Recovery’s assignors for the medical expenses at issue. The Eleventh Circuit held that at this procedural stage MSP Recovery’s complaint plausibly alleged that Defendants had a demonstrated responsibility to pay the claims, and the court, therefore reversed and remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   The court explained that the district court found that it would not consider Exhibit A, which was attached to and referenced by incorporation in the factual allegations of MSP Recovery’s complaint. Because “documents attached to a complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference can generally be considered by a federal court in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),” the court concluded that the district court erred in failing to consider whether the complaint and Exhibit A, taken together, plausibly alleged that Defendants’ responsibility to pay had been demonstrated prior to suit. View "MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC, et al v. Metropolitan General Insurance Company, et al" on Justia Law

Beaulieu Group, LLC (“Beaulieu”), was “engaged in the distribution of carpet and hard surface flooring products in both residential and commercial markets in the United States and many foreign countries.” Beaulieu added new members to its board of directors but had insufficient borrowing power and liquidity to complete its turnaround efforts. Beaulieu and its affiliates each filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.   The bankruptcy court subsequently approved a plan of liquidation that involved transferring all of Beaulieu’s assets to a liquidating trust. PMCM 2, LLC (the “Trustee”), is the liquidating trustee for the Beaulieu Liquidating Trust. The creditor is Auriga Polymers Inc. (“Auriga”), which sold Beaulieu polyester resins and specialty polymers used in a range of products, including textiles, before the bankruptcy.   At issue was whether post-petition transfers made under 11 U.S.C. Section 503(b)(9) will reduce the creditor’s new value defense. The Eleventh Circuit held that, for purposes of Section 547(c)(4)(B), “otherwise unavoidable transfers” made after the debtor has filed for bankruptcy do not affect a creditor’s new value defense. Thus, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the bankruptcy court’s order on appeal.   The court wrote that the Bankruptcy Code empowers a trustee to claw back “preferences”. But the creditor who gives new value to the debtor after receiving a preference may use that new value to offset its preference liability. This “new value” defense, however, is itself offset to the extent that the debtor later makes an “otherwise unavoidable transfer” to the creditor on account of the value received. View "Auriga Polymers Inc. v. PMCM2, LLC" on Justia Law