Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sued the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC) and related parties under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 2333. They based their claims on the FARC’s commission of offenses like kidnapping and murder in Colombia.   Plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against Defendants and based on their submissions the district court awarded them significant damages. After obtaining that judgment, Plaintiffs sought to attach the assets of third parties blocked by the Office of Foreign Assets Control. The final judgment entered by the clerk described the monetary awards to each of the plaintiffs (including the trebled portions) as “compensatory damages.”   Plaintiffs instituted garnishment proceedings in district court to attach the assets of Defendant and several limited liability companies he owns or controls. Plaintiffs filed a motion, in this case, asking the district court to amend the final judgment by removing the references to “compensatory damages.” They argued that the clerk of court erred in characterizing the trebled amounts of the awards as “compensatory damages” when the court itself had not described them in that way.   The district court denied the Rule 60(a) motion in a written order. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial. The court explained that Rule 60(a) provides that a court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other parts of the record. Here, the court saw no abuse of discretion (or clear error) when the district court found that the intent was for the entire $318 million to be deemed compensatory. View "Keith Stansell, et al v. Samark Jose Lopez Bello, et al" on Justia Law

An assistant district attorney (the “DA”) in Fulton County, Georgia obtained a material witness warrant requiring Plaintiff to appear as a witness at trial. Plaintiff voluntarily appeared at trial, making execution of the warrant unnecessary. After the trial ended, the DA failed to inform the trial judge that the warrant needed to be recalled. A few months later, a police officer arrested Plaintiff and placed him in jail because of the outstanding warrant. A judge eventually ordered Plaintiff’s release.   Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action alleging, among other things, that the DA’s failure to initiate the warrant’s cancelation violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The DA moved to dismiss the suit arguing that as a prosecutor she was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. The district court agreed and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against her.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that absolute prosecutorial immunity does not extend to DA’s failure to take action to cancel the warrant. The district court thus erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint.   The court wrote that determining whether prosecutorial immunity applies requires the court to take a fact-specific functional approach. Here, the court found that applying Third Circuit precedent from Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2008), results in the conclusion that the DA is not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. Thus the DA has failed to show that absolute immunity protects her post-trial conduct here. View "Kidanemariam Kassa v. Antionette Stephenson" on Justia Law

Various actors in the Medicare Advantage program assigned claims for failure to pay or reimburse medical expenses owed under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act to Plaintiffs—MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC; MSPA Claims 1, LLC; and MAO-MSO Recovery II LLC, Series PMPI, (collectively, “MSP Recovery”). MSP Recovery then asserted those claims against Metropolitan General Insurance Company, Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company, Metropolitan Group Property & Casualty Insurance Company, Metlife Auto & Home Group, and Metropolitan P&C Insurance Company (collectively, “Defendants”).   The district court dismissed MSP Recovery’s claims because the complaint failed to show that Defendants had a “demonstrated responsibility” to reimburse MSP Recovery’s assignors for the medical expenses at issue. The Eleventh Circuit held that at this procedural stage MSP Recovery’s complaint plausibly alleged that Defendants had a demonstrated responsibility to pay the claims, and the court, therefore reversed and remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   The court explained that the district court found that it would not consider Exhibit A, which was attached to and referenced by incorporation in the factual allegations of MSP Recovery’s complaint. Because “documents attached to a complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference can generally be considered by a federal court in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),” the court concluded that the district court erred in failing to consider whether the complaint and Exhibit A, taken together, plausibly alleged that Defendants’ responsibility to pay had been demonstrated prior to suit. View "MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC, et al v. Metropolitan General Insurance Company, et al" on Justia Law

Beaulieu Group, LLC (“Beaulieu”), was “engaged in the distribution of carpet and hard surface flooring products in both residential and commercial markets in the United States and many foreign countries.” Beaulieu added new members to its board of directors but had insufficient borrowing power and liquidity to complete its turnaround efforts. Beaulieu and its affiliates each filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.   The bankruptcy court subsequently approved a plan of liquidation that involved transferring all of Beaulieu’s assets to a liquidating trust. PMCM 2, LLC (the “Trustee”), is the liquidating trustee for the Beaulieu Liquidating Trust. The creditor is Auriga Polymers Inc. (“Auriga”), which sold Beaulieu polyester resins and specialty polymers used in a range of products, including textiles, before the bankruptcy.   At issue was whether post-petition transfers made under 11 U.S.C. Section 503(b)(9) will reduce the creditor’s new value defense. The Eleventh Circuit held that, for purposes of Section 547(c)(4)(B), “otherwise unavoidable transfers” made after the debtor has filed for bankruptcy do not affect a creditor’s new value defense. Thus, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the bankruptcy court’s order on appeal.   The court wrote that the Bankruptcy Code empowers a trustee to claw back “preferences”. But the creditor who gives new value to the debtor after receiving a preference may use that new value to offset its preference liability. This “new value” defense, however, is itself offset to the extent that the debtor later makes an “otherwise unavoidable transfer” to the creditor on account of the value received. View "Auriga Polymers Inc. v. PMCM2, LLC" on Justia Law

A federal grand jury returned a sealed indictment against Defendant (“Senior”) and co-Defendant, his son, (“Junior”). The jury convicted Senior on all counts and Junior on counts one (conspiracy) and two (wire fraud). Both Senior and Junior again filed motions seeking a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a new trial. The district court denied the motions.   Both Senior and Junior appealed on various grounds. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendants’ motions. The court held that the district court committed no reversible error nor did it abuse its discretion.   The court first considered whether the evidence was sufficient to support Senior and Junior’s convictions for wire fraud. The court explained that to be convicted of wire fraud, a person must “(1) intentionally participate in a scheme or artifice to defraud another of money or property and (2) use or ‘cause’ the use of the mails or wires for the purpose of executing the scheme or artifice.” The court held that here the Government presented substantial evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Junior knowingly and intentionally participated in Senior’s fraudulent scheme.   Further, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Senior’s proposed jury instructions on the “intent to harm” element of the wire and bank fraud charges. The District Court’s instruction addressed the substance of the instruction in its charge and Senior’s ability to present an effective defense was in no way impaired by the district court’s refusal to use his proposed instruction. View "USA v. Donald Watkins, Jr., et al." on Justia Law

On appeal, Defendant challenged his convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and possessing with intent to distribute. Defendant’s four claims on appeal focused on three discrete portions of his criminal proceeding: the initial arrest, the jury selection, and the trial itself. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence.   Defendant contended that the collateral estoppel doctrine precluded the federal government from relitigating the legality of the traffic stop and the subsequent search of the Suburban as that identical issue was already decided in state court. The court held that because the federal and state governments were not in privity in this case, the federal government was not estopped from relitigating the legality of the traffic stop, the search, and Defendant’s arrest.   Next, Defendant argued that the district court (1) abused its discretion by striking Juror 13 for cause; and (2) erred in sustaining the government’s Batson challenge and seating Juror 11 over Defendant’s peremptory strike. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking Juror 13 for cause during the voir dire stage of Defendant’s case. Juror 13 never confirmed that she felt capable of following the law and the court’s instructions, thus the district court acted within its wide discretion in striking Juror 13 for cause. Moreover, the court concluded that the district court’s finding of discriminatory intent in the peremptory strike of Juror 11 was not clearly erroneous. Further, any error in excluding evidence relating to why the state court prosecution ended did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. View "USA v. Alfonzo Lewis" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who is serving two death sentences and a term of life imprisonment, filed a federal habeas petition alleging that his counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance during the penalty phase and that the jurors engaged in premature deliberations before the penalty phase in violation of his constitutional right to a fair trial. The district court denied relief on Petitioner’s juror misconduct claim but concluded that the state court’s determination that counsel was not ineffective was an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The district court conditionally granted Petitioner habeas relief on his ineffective-assistance claim.   The Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections (“Alabama”) appealed the grant of habeas relief. Petitioner cross-appealed, arguing that the district court correctly granted habeas relief on his ineffective-assistance claim. In the alternative, he argued that habeas relief is warranted on his juror misconduct claim.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision on Petitioner’s ineffective-assistance claim because the state court’s determination that counsel was not ineffective during the penalty phase was not contrary to, or based on an unreasonable application of, Strickland. The court affirmed the denial of habeas relief for the juror misconduct claim.   The court explained that the record developed by Petitioner does not show that the state court’s determination that his counsel’s performance was not unreasonable “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Petitioner also failed to demonstrate that the state court’s determination that he did not satisfy the prejudice prong was an unreasonable application of Strickland. View "Keith Edmund Gavin v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his total life sentence following his conviction for enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity and production of child pornography. Defendant argued that his life sentence, imposed after an upward variance, is substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to consider his mitigation arguments, considered improper factors, and unreasonably weighed the 18 U.S.C. Section 3553 sentencing factors.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court properly calculated the applicable Guidelines range but found that the resulting range did not adequately reflect Defendant’s criminal history or the need to protect the public. This is a finding that the district court was within its discretion to make, as the Supreme Court has held that a variance from the Guidelines range can “be based on the sentencing judge’s disagreement with whether [the advisory sentence] properly reflects the Section 3553(a) factors.” Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254. And Defendant has not shown that the district court’s emphasis on certain sentencing factors was “unjustified.” View "USA v. Travis M. Butler" on Justia Law

Petitioner went to trial for three counts of tax fraud under 18 U.S.C. Sections 2 and 287 and one count of attempted tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. Section 7201. A jury convicted on all four counts, and he was sentenced to a period of incarceration, supervised release, and restitution. The district court vacated the convictions for the first three counts of tax fraud but left in place the fourth for tax evasion. Petitioner timely appealed, renewing his arguments that his counsel was ineffective 1) in failing to properly move for judgment of acquittal as to Count Four, 2) in calling him to the witness stand, and 3) in failing to advise him of the dangers of testifying in his own defense.   The Eleventh Circuit granted Petitioner’s habeas petition and vacated his conviction under Count Four for tax evasion. The court explained that as to Count Four for attempted tax evasion, the basic inquiry on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is, whether Petitioner’s trial counsel was deficient in failing to move for judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 after the Government’s presentation of its case-in-chief, and, if so, whether that deficiency prejudiced the outcome of the trial.   The court wrote that here Petitioner’s counsel’s performance was deficient because he failed to properly move for judgment of acquittal when the Government had not carried its evidentiary burden in its case-in-chief. Further, had Petitioner’s counsel properly moved for judgment of acquittal, the district court would have been legally required to grant it for the same reasons the Eleventh Circuit did under a de novo standard. View "Peter Hesser v. USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff regularly used Roundup on his lawn for about 30 years. Plaintiff was diagnosed with malignant fibrous histiocytoma, which he believes was linked to the main chemical ingredient in Roundup. Plaintiff filed against Monsanto, the manufacturer of Roundup®. In his four-count complaint, he alleged strict liability for a design defect under Georgia law (Count I); strict liability for failure to warn under Georgia law (Count II); negligence under Georgia law (Count III); and breach of implied warranties under Georgia law (Count IV). The district court granted Defendant’s motion, thereby eliminating Counts I and III from the Complaint. Plaintiff timely appealed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings as to Count II.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded. The court held that Plaintiff’s failure to warn claim is not preempted by the federal requirements under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) or the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) actions pursuant to it. The court explained that sometimes IFRA or the EPA’s actions pursuant to FIFRA may preempt state law. But only federal action with the force of law has the capacity to preempt state law. Here, the problem for Monsanto is that the EPA’s registration process is not sufficiently formal to carry with it the force of law under Mead. Further, Monsanto cannot wave the “formality” wand on EPA actions to accomplish compliance with the Mead standard. None of them are the product of “notice-and-comment rulemaking” or “formal adjudication.” Nor do the EPA letters Monsanto points to “bespeak the legislative type of activity that would naturally bind” Monsanto. View "John D. Carson v. Monsanto Company" on Justia Law