Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Immigration Petitioner petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision that concluded that Petitioner was removable based on (1) his two state convictions for felony transporting into Virginia controlled substances with the intent to distribute and (2) his third state conviction for felony conspiracy to transport marijuana into Virginia.   On appeal to the BIA, Petitioner argued his Virginia offenses were not categorically CIMTs. The government did not cross-appeal to the BIA the IJ’s divisibility ruling, but it did “maintain” in a motion for summary affirmance that Va. Code Ann. Section 18.2- 248.01 was divisible and the modified categorical approach should apply. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision that Petitioner was removable on CIMT grounds under both INA Section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) and (ii), 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) and (ii). Stressing that it had long held that “participation in illicit drug trafficking is a CIMT,” the BIA agreed with the IJ that a violation of Va. Code Ann. Section 18.2-248.01 was categorically a CIMT.   The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition, holding that the BIA did not err in concluding that Petitioner was removable because his state drug trafficking convictions categorically constitute crimes involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”) within the meaning of Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) Section 237(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii), 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii). Further, the Supreme Court’s decision in Jordan v. De George forecloses Petitioner’s claim that the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” in the INA is unconstitutionally vague. View "Everton Daye v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Charles and Tracy Lamirand took out a mortgage loan to buy a home in Florida but did not keep up with the payments. After they defaulted, the loan servicer sued to foreclose on the home. While the foreclosure suit was pending, Fay Servicing took over the loan. A disagreement arose, leading the Lamirands to sue Fay Servicing. The parties soon settled both lawsuits and agreed that the Lamirands owed $85,790.99 on the loan, to be paid in one year. But four months later, Fay Servicing sent the Lamirands a mortgage statement notifying them that their loan had “been accelerated” because they were “late on [their] monthly payments.” On Fay Servicing’s fast-tracked timetable, the Lamirands owed $92,789.55 to be paid in a month. If they did not pay, Fay Servicing’s statement warned, they risked more fees and even “the loss of [their] home to a foreclosure sale.” The statement then detailed many ways the Lamirands might pay. The statements distressed the Lamirands, who thought they needed to pay only $85,790.99 and make that payment by the date set in the settlement agreement. They eventually sued, alleging that by sending the statements Fay Servicing had violated the FDCPA and Florida’s Consumer Collection Practices Act. To the district court, the periodic statements were unrelated to debt collection, even though they urged the Lamirands to make their past-due loan payments, because Fay Servicing was required to send monthly updates under the Truth in Lending Act. The court thus held that the Lamirands had not stated an FDCPA claim, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Florida law claims, and dismissed the complaint. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found a periodic statement mandated by the Truth in Lending Act could also be a debt-collection communication covered by the FDCPA. Because the complaint here plausibly alleged the periodic statements sent to the plaintiffs aimed to collect their debt, the district court’s dismissal of their complaint was reversed. View "Lamirand, et al v. Fay Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was imprisoned at Hays State Prison after he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. While he lived there, Plaintiff killed another inmate by stabbing him with a knife during a fight. Plaintiff disagreed with prison policy regarding shower security. Plaintiff believed that the restrictions infringed his constitutional rights.   To challenge these policies and raise a host of other complaints, Plaintiff sued several prison officials under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Section 2000cc–1, and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. In his complaint, Plaintiff claimed that the shower policies intruded on his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the prison officials on his shower policy claims.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The court explained to test whether a state prison regulation violates an inmate’s constitutional rights, courts ask whether the regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. That inquiry is intended to ensure that prison officials respect constitutional boundaries without frustrating their efforts to fulfill the difficult responsibility of prison administration.   Here, although the inmate suggests ways the prison could make an exception to accommodate his religious requests, he does not show that the policies were unconstitutional in the first place. And even if they were, qualified immunity would protect the officials because the types of shower rights the inmate seeks are not clearly established. View "Hjalmar Rodriguez, Jr. v. Edward H. Burnside, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his counsel, Anderson + Wanca (“Wanca”), appealed the district court’s denial of their motion for Wanca to receive a portion of the attorneys’ fees resulting from the settlement of a class-action lawsuit brought under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. Section 227. Wanca, while not appointed as class counsel in this case, began the chain of litigation that resulted in the settlement below and so contends that it provided a substantial and independent benefit to the class justifying a portion of the attorneys’ fees.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court explained that while the court did find that Wanca has shown it provided one substantial and independent benefit to the class, Wanca’s prioritization of its interests over the class’s interests throughout the litigation forecloses the equitable relief Wanca seeks.   The court explained that non-class counsel is generally entitled to a portion of a common fund recovered in a class action as attorneys’ fees under Rule 23(h) if non-class counsel confers a substantial and independent benefit to the class that aids in the recovery or improvement of the common fund.  Here, the mere fact that Wanca devoted substantial time and effort to litigating this class action does not entitle Wanca to attorneys’ fees. Simply put, most of the 671.95 hours Wanca spent litigating Arkin I and II did not aid in the recovery or improvement of the common fund obtained under the Pressman Settlement in Arkin III. View "Steven Arkin, et al. v. Smith Medical Partners, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a lifelong smoker, sued Philip Morris USA, Inc., seeking damages for the injuries she sustained as a result of smoking Philip Morris’s cigarettes, specifically her development of peripheral vascular disease (“PVD”), a debilitating disease that eventually required the amputation of both of her legs, among other injuries. A jury returned verdicts against Philip Morris for Brown’s claims for strict liability, negligence, fraudulent concealment, and conspiracy to fraudulently conceal, and awarded Brown $8,287,448 in compensatory damages and $9 million in punitive damages.Philip Morris appealed the District Court’s denial of its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the fraud claims, arguing that Plaintiff presented insufficient evidence to show that she relied to her detriment on statements made by Philip Morris that concealed material information about the health effects or addictive nature of smoking, or that such reliance was a legal cause of her smoking-related disease.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Plaintiff’s jury verdicts for her negligence and strict liability claims, but reversed and remanded on Plaintiff's fraud claims based on the reasoning in Prentice v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. SC20-291, 2022 WL 805951 (Fla. 2022). Engle-progeny plaintiffs bringing a fraudulent concealment or conspiracy to fraudulently conceal claim must prove reliance on one or more specific statements by an Engle defendant. Plaintiff relied on evidence of Philip Morris’s disinformation campaign, which is no longer sufficient under Prentice. View "Donna Brown v. Philip Morris USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Public Risk Management of Florida (“PRM”) Munich Reinsurance America, Inc. (“Munich”) for breach of contract and sought declaratory relief that Munich is obligated by the parties’ reinsurance agreement (“the Reinsurance Agreement”) to reimburse PRM for the defense and coverage it provided to an insured in an underlying lawsuit. Munich counter-claimed for a declaratory judgment stating that it has no duty to reimburse PRM, and the district court granted that relief. On appeal, PRM argues, inter alia, that the Reinsurance Agreement contained a “follow the fortunes” clause, which forbids a reinsurer “from second guessing” an insurer’s “good faith decision” to pay a claim to the insured.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment holding that the district court correctly decided that Munich had no duty to reimburse PRM for its defense and indemnification of the City in the underlying Section 1983 suit. The court explained that The Reinsurance Agreement contains language that is plainly inconsistent with the follow the-fortunes doctrine. Accordingly, the district court properly rejected the doctrine’s application in this case. Further, the court held that it will not infer the application of the follow-the-fortunes doctrine in a reinsurance agreement where the agreement’s plain and unambiguous language is inconsistent with the doctrine. Applying this rule the court concluded that it would be inconsistent with the plain, unambiguous terms of the Reinsurance Agreement to infer that Munich should be bound by PRM’s coverage decision. View "Public Risk Management of Florida v. Munich Reinsurance America, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate his 293-month prison sentence and convictions. Petitioner argued to the district court that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Petitioner asserted that his attorney told him if he pled guilty to five counts of mail fraud, he would serve no more than 10 years in prison because she had a deal with the government that his sentencing range would be 97–121 months’ imprisonment under the Sentencing Guidelines   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and found that Petitioner’s attorney did not provide Petitioner with ineffective assistance by telling him she had an agreement with the government about his guideline range. Further, the court concluded that Petitioner’s attorney did provide ineffective assistance by underestimating Petitioner’s guideline range.   The court explained that to show deficient performance, the movant must establish that his attorney’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” The “petitioner bears the heavy burden of showing that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.” Gissendaner v. Seaboldt, 735 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2013).   Here, the court concluded that there was no clear error in the district court’s finding that Petitioner’s attorney reviewed each provision of the plea agreement with him at some point before the change-of-plea hearing. Further, the court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Petitioner’s attorney reviewed the plea agreement with Petitioner before the change-of-plea hearing. View "Michael Riolo v. USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff agreed to help Defendants LLC obtain financing, and Defendants agreed to assign Plaintiff and his company their majority stake in the LLC.AN issue arose regarding what that assignment entailed. After years of litigation and a two-week trial, the jury awarded Plaintiff a four-million-dollar verdict on claims of fraud and conversion, which they reduced by a half-million dollars for his failure to mitigate damages. Defendants now seek to vacate that verdict, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded in part. The court held that the district court had subject matter over this action, and the Circuit Court has jurisdiction over the appeal. Second, none of the issues raised by Defendants on appeal warrant reversal. And three, on Plaintiff's cross-appeal, the district court erred in giving a failure-to-mitigate instruction to the jury. The court thus reinstated the $500,000 that the jury subtracted from the compensatory damages award.   The court explained that Plaintiff's federal civil RICO claim was not so obviously frivolous that it failed to invoke federal jurisdiction. And although the district court could have declined to continue exercising jurisdiction once the federal RICO claim was dismissed, the parties consented to litigate the remaining state law claims in federal court. As a result, Defendants cannot argue on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by declining to dismiss the case. View "Arturo Rubinstein, et al v. Yoram Yehuba, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff wanted to share his religious message on the public streets and sidewalks of Fort Myers Beach, Florida (“the Town”). However, to reduce visual blight and increase traffic safety, Chapter 30 of the Town’s Land Development Code (hereinafter, “the Ordinance”) prescribed an elaborate permitting scheme for all signs to be displayed within the Town. Among other things, the Ordinance has entirely prohibited some categories of signs, including portable signs. Plaintiff carried a portable sign to spread his message and, after receiving a written warning, the Town issued him a citation. He sued the Town and the officers who cited him in their individual and official capacities for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging violations of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and Florida’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the Ordinance’s ban on portable signs was content-neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgment. The court explained that the Town’s complete ban on all portable signs carried in all locations almost surely violates the First Amendment. The court wrote that the most natural reading of the Ordinance leads to the conclusion that all portable signs are banned--regardless of whether they are political, religious, advertising a garage sale, or an open house. The Ordinance’s ban on portable signs is content-neutral. But portable, handheld signs still are a rich part of the American political tradition and are one of the most common methods of free expression. The ban on these signs leaves the residents without an effective alternative channel of communication. View "Adam Lacroix v. Town of Fort Myers Beach, Florida, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was working as a human resources manager for Georgia Pacific when she gave deposition testimony in a pregnancy discrimination lawsuit against her former employer. A week after finding out that she had testified against her former employer, Georgia Pacific fired her. Plaintiff then sued Georgia Pacific for unlawfully retaliating against her in violation of Title VII.   The district court granted summary judgment to Georgia Pacific because it interpreted Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision as inapplicable. Georgia Pacific defends the summary judgment in its favor on the two grounds the district court gave and also puts forward three grounds that the court did not reach, contending that: Plaintiff's complaint goes beyond the scope of her EEOC charge; she has not established a genuine issue of material fact on causation; she has not established a genuine issue of material fact on pretext.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that the district court erred on both grounds it gave for entering summary judgment against Plaintiff. The court explained that neither the manager exception nor the requirement that an employee’s conduct relates to her current employer has any basis in the statutory text. They are not a part of Title VII’s opposition clause or participation clause. Additionally, Georgia Pacific’s proposed alternative grounds for summary judgment each fail. Plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies, and she has created a genuine issue of material fact on both causation and pretext. View "Marie Patterson v. Georgia Pacific, LLC, et al." on Justia Law