Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) final order affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for asylum on account of racial persecution. Petitioner had applied for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) Section 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. Section 1158(b)(1), withholding of removal under INA Section 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. Section 1231(b)(3), and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 8 C.F.R. Section 208.16(c). On appeal, Petitioner argued that (1) the BIA failed to provide reasoned consideration on his request for asylum relief based on racial persecution, having adopted in large part the IJ’s determination making the same mistake, and (2) the IJ should have permitted him advance notice of the need for specific corroborating evidence to meet his burden of proof and an automatic continuance to provide that evidence after determining that his testimony was credible because 8 U.S.C. Section 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) requires it.   The Eleventh Circuit denied Petitioner’s request to review the BIA's final order. The court held that the BIA’s decision makes clear that it provided reasoned consideration to Petitioner’s racial claim. The court reasoned that a review of the decision shows that the BIA did not misstate the contents of the record, fail to adequately explain its rejection of logical conclusions, or provide an unreasonable justification for its decision, which, when present, would tend to suggest a failure to provide reasoned consideration. The court dismissed the rest of the petition finding that Petitioner failed to exhaust his second claim. View "Sergio Elias Lopez Morales v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Defendant, a physician who operates a medical clinic, was under investigation for healthcare fraud and related charges. During the investigation, law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant permitting them to search the clinic. During the search, one officer found a bag of videotapes. The officer played the tapes, which led to Defendant being charged with several child pornography offenses. Defendant unsuccessfully sought suppression of the tapes at trial.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. The search warrant application specifically mentioned "videotapes" among the items to be searched. Thus, the officer's search of the tapes was covered by the search warrant.The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Defendant's claim that his right to a public trial was violated when the district judge closed the courtroom during several witnesses' testimony. Defendant agreed to most of the closures and failed to object to any of the other closures. View "USA v. Ronald Tai Young Moon, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a federal prisoner, appealed the district court’s denial of his timely 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate. In his motion, Petitioner challenged his felon-in-possession conviction, arguing that the district court erred when it instructed the jury on aiding and abetting even though the government failed to prove that Petitioner knew his co-defendant was a convicted felon.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s Section 2255 motion, vacated the felon-in-possession conviction, and remanded. The court held that Rehaif applies retroactively to Petitioner’s initial Section 2255 motion, that Petitioner’s Rehaif claim is neither procedurally barred nor defaulted, and that the district court’s error was not harmless. The court reasoned it is likely that the jury listened to the government’s guidance, asked a question about Petitioner's principal liability, received an answer suggesting Petitioner could not be convicted under that theory, opted for the aiding and abetting instruction, and convicted Petitioner based on that theory of liability. As a result, the court expressed grave doubts about whether the district court’s error substantially influenced the jury verdict, and thus it found that the error actually prejudiced Petitioner, and cannot be deemed harmless. View "Isaac Seabrooks v. USA" on Justia Law

Florida Senate Bill 90 ("SB 90") imposed certain restrictions on citing. Plaintiffs challenged several provisions of SB 90, claiming the provisions violated the prohibition against race discrimination under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Plaintiffs also alleged the provisions were vague or overbroad in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and that the provisions compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. The district court found that SB 90 restricted the right to vote and permanently enjoined certain provisions of SB 90. The court also imposed a preclearance requirement under which Florida needed to obtain the district court's approval before enacting or amending certain election laws. Florida sought a stay of the district court's order pending its appeal.The Eleventh Circuit granted Florida's request to stay the district court's order pending appeal. The court noted that changing election laws as an election nears can cause voter confusion. Thus, Federal district courts ordinarily should not enjoin state election laws in the period close to an election. Here, a statewide election was less than four months away. Thus, Florida has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process.Applying the reasoning from Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006), the court found that the state has a reduced burden to obtain a stay and only needs to show that Plaintiff's position is not "entirely clearcut." Thus, the court granted Florida's request for a stay pending appeal. View "Harriet Tubman Freedom Fighters Corp, et al v. Florida Secretary of State, et al" on Justia Law

In a consolidated appeal each of the insured businesses, SA Palm Beach, LLC, Emerald Coast Restaurants, Inc., Rococo Steak, LLC, and R.T.G. Furniture, Corporation, were denied after seeking coverage under an all-risk insurance policy that provides compensation for losses and expenses incurred in connection with “direct physical loss of or damage to” the covered property or “direct physical loss or damage to” the covered property. The Eleventh Circuit addressed the question of whether under Florida law, all-risk commercial insurance policies provide coverage for “direct physical loss of or damage to” property or “direct physical loss or damage to” property insure against losses and expenses incurred by businesses as a result of COVID-19. The court affirmed in part and vacated in part, the district court’s dismissal of the complaints. The court held that under Florida law there is no coverage because COVID-19 did not cause a tangible alteration of the insured property. The court reasoned that under Florida law, an insurance policy should be read “as a whole, endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and operative effect.” Further, Florida Supreme Court has explained, that an “all-risk policy” does not extend coverage to “every conceivable loss.” Thus, the court found that it believes that the Florida Supreme Court would hold that, under the allegations in the complaints before the court, there is no coverage. The court vacated in part the dismissal of Emerald Coast’s complaint finding that the district court did not address the Plaintiff’s Spoilage provision claim. View "SA Palm Beach, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff slipped on a puddle of water and broke her hip shortly after boarding a Carnival cruise ship. She then sued the cruise line for negligence. The district court granted summary judgment for Carnival, holding that it lacked a duty to protect Plaintiff because its crewmembers had neither actual nor constructive notice of the particular puddle that caused her fall.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court, holding that the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant on the basis that Defendant lacked notice was improper. The court found that the district court failed to faithfully follow Carroll. (Carroll v. Carnival Corp., 955 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir. 2020.) The relevant question, in this case, was whether Carnival “had actual or constructive knowledge that the pool deck where [Plaintiff] fell could be slippery (and therefore dangerous) when wet.” The fact that warning signs were “posted on the pool deck” in the general area of Plaintiff’s fall, when “viewed in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff], is enough to withstand summary judgment as to notice.” View "Mary Brady v. Carnival Corporation" on Justia Law

Appellants sought review of the district court’s order and judgment dismissing their claims against two of four defendants in their lawsuit. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a), the district court transferred the claims against the remaining defendants to the United States District Court for the District of Utah. Appellants asserted that the order dismissing the claims against the two defendants is a final decision over which the Eleventh Circuit has appellate jurisdiction. The Appellants argued that combined with the dismissal of the claims against some defendants, the district court’s decision to transfer the remainder of the action confers appellate jurisdiction to the Eleventh Circuit because nothing remains for the transferring court to do.The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Appellant’s appeal in their claims against Defendants, finding the court lacked jurisdiction. The court reasoned that as a court of limited jurisdiction, it may exercise appellate jurisdiction only where “authorized by Constitution and statute.” Further, a final decision “is one that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." View "Hal Jenkins, et al. v. Prime Insurance Co, et al." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit addressed whether a bankruptcy plan of reorganization confirmed in 1995 discharged the obligation of three debtor companies to provide future health-care benefits to retired employees of a coal company that was once part of the same corporate family. After the coal company’s future obligations to the retirees were discharged, the trustees of two healthcare benefit funds sued to compel the related companies to pay for the benefits. The bankruptcy court and district court ruled that the 1995 plan of reorganization did not discharge the claims for future benefits.   On appeal, the parties dispute whether the companies’ Coal Act obligations were discharged by the 1995 order confirming the companies’ plan of reorganization.  The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s holding and found that because the companies’ obligations to provide health-care benefits were fixed before the bankruptcy court confirmed the plan of reorganization, the Trustees’ claims for future retiree benefits were discharged in 1995. The court reasoned that the Trustees held a “claim” in 1995 because they had a “fixed” “right to payment.” Further, the Trustees’ claim under Section 9711 and resulting claims for 1992 plan premiums were discharged in 1995. View "United States Pipe and Foundry Company LLC, et al. v. Michael H. Holland, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife were passengers on a cruise aboard a ship operated by Defendant. A verbal altercation between Plaintiff and another passenger ensued and while the security officer turned to speak to Plaintiff, the other passenger punched Plaintiff in the face.   Plaintiff alleged that Defendant was negligent because it failed to (a) reasonably and properly train security personnel; (b) have adequate security measures, including adequate security presence and surveillance cameras; (c) warn him of the danger of being physically assaulted while onboard the vessel; (d) promulgate and enforce policies and procedures designed to prevent passengers from physically assaulting other passengers; and (e) exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, ruling that there was no evidence suggesting that Defendant had actual or constructive notice of the risk of harm.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Defendant and denied Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions. The court held that Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether Defendant had actual notice that any passengers would attack him. The court reasoned that in the context of passenger-on-passenger violence, a cruise line has a duty to warn and/or protect when it or its employees reasonably apprehend the danger such that the attack was foreseeable. However, while the presence of a security officer during disembarkation connotes some awareness of the importance of order, a verbal dispute does not provide actual notice that a physical assault is to follow. View "Reinier Fuentes v. Classica Cruise Operator Ltd, Inc." on Justia Law

The dispute arose out of a contract between Purple Shovel and two companies Omnipol and Elmex Praha (“Elmex”), for the manufacture and delivery of AK-47 assault rifles. The U.S. Special Operations Command (“SOCOM”) entered into a contract (the “SOCOM contract”) with Purple Shovel to deliver the rifles for a set price. Together, the parties entered into a “Cooperation Agreement.”   Purple Shovel never paid Elmex and, in turn, Elmex failed to pay Omnipol. Plaintiffs brought an action against several individuals allegedly involved in the formation of the two contracts and asserted six claims against Defendants. The District Court dismissed the amended complaint on all counts and with respect to all Defendants.   On appeal, Plaintiffs challenged the district court’s substitution of the United States as a party in the place of the civilian employees. They also challenged the district court’s finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the state law claims due to the bar of sovereign immunity.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s amended complaint. The court held that the district court was correct in concluding both that no additional discovery was needed on the scope-of-employment issue and that the United States had been properly substituted as Defendant. Further, the district court did not err in dismissing the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Omnipol, A.S., et al. v. Christopher Worrell, et al." on Justia Law