Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate his 293-month prison sentence and convictions. Petitioner argued to the district court that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Petitioner asserted that his attorney told him if he pled guilty to five counts of mail fraud, he would serve no more than 10 years in prison because she had a deal with the government that his sentencing range would be 97–121 months’ imprisonment under the Sentencing Guidelines   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and found that Petitioner’s attorney did not provide Petitioner with ineffective assistance by telling him she had an agreement with the government about his guideline range. Further, the court concluded that Petitioner’s attorney did provide ineffective assistance by underestimating Petitioner’s guideline range.   The court explained that to show deficient performance, the movant must establish that his attorney’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” The “petitioner bears the heavy burden of showing that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.” Gissendaner v. Seaboldt, 735 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2013).   Here, the court concluded that there was no clear error in the district court’s finding that Petitioner’s attorney reviewed each provision of the plea agreement with him at some point before the change-of-plea hearing. Further, the court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Petitioner’s attorney reviewed the plea agreement with Petitioner before the change-of-plea hearing. View "Michael Riolo v. USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff agreed to help Defendants LLC obtain financing, and Defendants agreed to assign Plaintiff and his company their majority stake in the LLC.AN issue arose regarding what that assignment entailed. After years of litigation and a two-week trial, the jury awarded Plaintiff a four-million-dollar verdict on claims of fraud and conversion, which they reduced by a half-million dollars for his failure to mitigate damages. Defendants now seek to vacate that verdict, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded in part. The court held that the district court had subject matter over this action, and the Circuit Court has jurisdiction over the appeal. Second, none of the issues raised by Defendants on appeal warrant reversal. And three, on Plaintiff's cross-appeal, the district court erred in giving a failure-to-mitigate instruction to the jury. The court thus reinstated the $500,000 that the jury subtracted from the compensatory damages award.   The court explained that Plaintiff's federal civil RICO claim was not so obviously frivolous that it failed to invoke federal jurisdiction. And although the district court could have declined to continue exercising jurisdiction once the federal RICO claim was dismissed, the parties consented to litigate the remaining state law claims in federal court. As a result, Defendants cannot argue on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by declining to dismiss the case. View "Arturo Rubinstein, et al v. Yoram Yehuba, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff wanted to share his religious message on the public streets and sidewalks of Fort Myers Beach, Florida (“the Town”). However, to reduce visual blight and increase traffic safety, Chapter 30 of the Town’s Land Development Code (hereinafter, “the Ordinance”) prescribed an elaborate permitting scheme for all signs to be displayed within the Town. Among other things, the Ordinance has entirely prohibited some categories of signs, including portable signs. Plaintiff carried a portable sign to spread his message and, after receiving a written warning, the Town issued him a citation. He sued the Town and the officers who cited him in their individual and official capacities for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging violations of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and Florida’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the Ordinance’s ban on portable signs was content-neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgment. The court explained that the Town’s complete ban on all portable signs carried in all locations almost surely violates the First Amendment. The court wrote that the most natural reading of the Ordinance leads to the conclusion that all portable signs are banned--regardless of whether they are political, religious, advertising a garage sale, or an open house. The Ordinance’s ban on portable signs is content-neutral. But portable, handheld signs still are a rich part of the American political tradition and are one of the most common methods of free expression. The ban on these signs leaves the residents without an effective alternative channel of communication. View "Adam Lacroix v. Town of Fort Myers Beach, Florida, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was working as a human resources manager for Georgia Pacific when she gave deposition testimony in a pregnancy discrimination lawsuit against her former employer. A week after finding out that she had testified against her former employer, Georgia Pacific fired her. Plaintiff then sued Georgia Pacific for unlawfully retaliating against her in violation of Title VII.   The district court granted summary judgment to Georgia Pacific because it interpreted Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision as inapplicable. Georgia Pacific defends the summary judgment in its favor on the two grounds the district court gave and also puts forward three grounds that the court did not reach, contending that: Plaintiff's complaint goes beyond the scope of her EEOC charge; she has not established a genuine issue of material fact on causation; she has not established a genuine issue of material fact on pretext.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that the district court erred on both grounds it gave for entering summary judgment against Plaintiff. The court explained that neither the manager exception nor the requirement that an employee’s conduct relates to her current employer has any basis in the statutory text. They are not a part of Title VII’s opposition clause or participation clause. Additionally, Georgia Pacific’s proposed alternative grounds for summary judgment each fail. Plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies, and she has created a genuine issue of material fact on both causation and pretext. View "Marie Patterson v. Georgia Pacific, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Wreal, LLC, a pornography company, has been using the mark “FyreTV” in commerce since 2008. Defendant, Amazon.com, Inc., has been using the mark “Fire TV” (or “fireTV”) in commerce since 2012. Wreal contended that Amazon’s allegedly similar mark is causing consumers to associate its mark—“FyreTV”—with Amazon. After the close of discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to Amazon.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s ruling. The court explained that the case addresses the application of the seven likelihood-of-confusion factors to a reverse-confusion trademark infringement case. Although some of those factors are analyzed and applied in the same way in both reverse-confusion cases and the more familiar forward-confusion cases, there are important differences in how other factors are analyzed and applied that stem from the fact that the harm and the theory of infringement differ between forward and reverse confusion.   Here, the record evidence establishes that Amazon acquired actual knowledge of Wreal’s registered trademark and still launched a product line. The two marks at issue are nearly identical, the commercial strength of Amazon’s mark is consistent with Wreal’s theory of recovery. Furthermore, Wreal has identified two consumers who a reasonable juror could conclude were confused by Amazon’s chosen mark. The court wrote, that there is no mechanical formula for applying the seven factors relating to the likelihood of confusion. But when considering all seven factors as they apply to a theory of reverse confusion and taking all the circumstances of this case into account on the record, it concluded that they weigh heavily in favor of Wreal. View "Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffered serious injuries in an automobile accident and won over $12 million in a suit against the other driver. To recover the judgment, Plaintiff sued that driver’s insurance company on the theory that it acted in bad faith toward its insureds. The jury returned a verdict in the insurer’s favor, but Plaintiff argued that the district court abused its discretion by failing to give his proposed jury instruction.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling explaining that the district court’s instruction omitted the state law relevant to this theory of liability. The court explained that the district court instructed the jury on bad faith resulting from the failure to settle a claim. But Florida law provides—and Plaintiff argued at trial—that bad faith is also present when an insurance company fails to advise an insured about settlement offers and likely litigation outcomes. Further, Plaintiff’s proposed jury instruction correctly stated the legal basis for his failure-to-advise theory of liability, and the district court’s failure to give that instruction to the jury caused him prejudice. View "Dustin C. Brink v. Direct General Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s spouse was a medical doctor employed by NCHMD, Inc., which is a subsidiary of NCH Healthcare System, Inc. NCHMD’s human resources staff helped the spouse complete enrollment paperwork for life insurance benefits through an ERISA plan. Plaintiff was the primary beneficiary under the plan, and NCH Healthcare was the named plan administrator. After Plaintiff’s spouse died, Plaintiff filed a claim for benefits with the plan’s insurance company. The insurance company refused to pay any supplemental benefits because it had never received the form. Plaintiff sued NCHMD and NCH Healthcare, asserting a claim under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(1)(B). The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and denied Plaintiff leave to amend.   On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling. The court wrote that at issue is whether Section 1132(a)(3) creates a cause of action for an ERISA beneficiary to recover monetary benefits lost due to a fiduciary’s breach of fiduciary duty in the plan enrollment process? The court answered “yes”, and explained that under the court’s precedents, a court may order typical forms of equitable relief under Section 1132(a)(3). As the Supreme Court and many sister circuits have recognized, courts in equity could traditionally order an “equitable surcharge”— that a fiduciary pay a beneficiary for losses caused by the fiduciary’s breach of fiduciary duty. Accordingly, the court held that a beneficiary of an ERISA plan can bring a lawsuit under Section 1132(a)(3) against a fiduciary to recover benefits that were lost due to the fiduciary’s breach of its duties. View "Raniero Gimeno v. NCHMD, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a court-appointed receiver, appealed the district court’s dismissal of his aiding and abetting claims on behalf of the companies in receivership (the Receivership Entities) against PNC Bank. The district court granted PNC’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it found that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring those claims. The district court relied on our decision in Isaiah v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 960 F.3d 1296, 1308 (11th Cir. 2020).   On appeal, Plaintiff argued that he has standing because he was appointed pursuant to Section 501.207(3) of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders granting PNC’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denying Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration and leave to amend. The court held that even assuming that Section 501.207(3) applies, it does not rectify the standing issue in Isaiah because it does not expressly address the imputation of wrongful acts between the Receivership Entities themselves and their insiders. View "Jonathan E. Perlman v. PNC Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied for disability benefits, alleging that, as of August 2016, she was unable to work because of degenerative disc disease, bulging and herniated discs, other spine issues, fatigue, migraines, asthma, fatty liver, and food allergies. The district court affirmed the decision of the administrative law judge denying Plaintiff's claims. The district court determined that section 404.1520c, and not the treating-physician rule, applied to Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff argued that the court's earlier precedents establishing and applying the treating-physician rule are still good law, notwithstanding the promulgation of section 404.1520c.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the new regulation validly abrogated the treating-physician rule and applied to Plaintiff’s claim. The court found that the new regulation instructs administrative law judges to give a treating physician’s opinion no deference and instead to weigh medical opinions based on their persuasiveness. The Social Security Act (“Act”) conferred “exceptionally broad authority” to the Commissioner “to prescribe standards for applying certain sections of the . . . Act.” The court explained that it has never held that the treating-physician rule is unambiguously required by the Act.   Here, Plaintiff filed her disability claim on April 28, 2017, after the effective date for section 404.1520c. And because section 404.1520 forbids administrative law judges from “defer[ring] or giv[ing] any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s),” 20 C.F.R. Section 404.1520c(a), the administrative law judge did not err by declining to give more weight to the medical opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians. View "Zinta Harner v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked as property damage investigators for OSP Prevention Group. After their employment with OSP ended, Plaintiffs brought Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) claims against the company and its owner (collectively, “OSP”) for unpaid overtime wages. The district court granted summary judgment in OSP’s favor after concluding that Plaintiff fit within an FLSA exemption covering “administrative” employees. They both contend that they weren’t administrative employees but instead were “production” employees who performed the core service that OSP sold to its clients: investigating damage to property.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court finding that OSP has failed to show that the FLSA’s administrative exemption applies to Plaintiffs. The court explained that Plaintiffs engaged in OSP’s core function of damage investigations. Given the nature of their employer’s business, their investigative factfinding duties amounted to production work. Those duties did not involve “work directly related to [OSP’s] management or general business operations.” 29 C.F.R. Section 541.200(a)(2). The court wrote it need not address whether their work met the additional administrative exemption requirement of “includ[ing] the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.” Section  541.200(a)(3). Both requirements must be met for the exemption to apply. View "Philip Fowler, et al v. OSP Prevention Group, Inc." on Justia Law