Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Defendant over 107 acres of land that Plaintiff says should have been included in a mortgage signed over to him in 2012 from Defendant’s father-in-law. That mortgage was the major part of a settlement agreement between the assignor and Plaintiff and was handed over as a way of compensating Plaintiff for his share of profits. The parties agree that those 107 acres—known as “Parcel A”—were not part of the mortgaged property. But Plaintiff thinks that Parcel A should have been a part of the mortgage and that it was left out because of fraud or mistake. Defendant maintains that Parcel A was never a part of the deal and that the mortgage accurately reflects the parties’ agreement. Plaintiff sued Defendant asserting a claim for reformation.   The district court granted Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and (later) denied Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s claim for reformation is barred by the statute of limitations and the claim fails on the merits.  The court explained Alabama law provides that “[a]ctions for the recovery of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or the possession thereof” must be “commenced within 10 years” from the date on which the cause of action arises. Ala. Code Section 6-2-33(2) the assignor executed and delivered the mortgage to the clerk of court in 2006. But Plaintiff waited thirteen years—until 2019—to file this action. His claim is therefore untimely.  Further, because Plaintiff’s reformation claim is time-barred, the court needn’t reach its merits. View "A.M. Samara v. Thomas Keith Taylor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against several DeKalb County, Georgia investigators, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights during his arrest. Plaintiff claimed that S.D. used excessive force when he shot him three times, that V.J. used excessive force when he pistol-whipped him, and that all three Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on every claim.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for V.J. on the pistol-whip claim. But affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for S.D. on the shooting claim and for all Defendants on the deprivation of medical care claim.   The court held that V.J. used excessive force in pistol-whipping Plaintiff and that Plaintiff’s right to be free of V.J.’s use of force was clearly established at the time. Further, viewing the facts through the appropriate lens, V.J. could not have reasonably believed that Plaintiff was resisting when he tried to sit up after communicating that he needed to do so to breathe. And because “a handcuffed, non-resisting [suspect’s] right to be free from excessive force was clearly established” at the time, V.J is not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against him.   Finally, even though Plaintiff met his burden that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights, the court concluded that there was no established law on how long before officers must request medical care for a suspect that has been shot to constitute deliberate indifference. View "Nicholas C. Wade v. Solomon Daniels, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Jewish inmate at the Broward County Main Jail in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, did not participate in Passover in 2018 because he failed to register 45 days prior to its celebration as required by the Jail’s policy. Proceeding pro se, he sued Broward Sheriff’s Office Chaplains under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging violations of his rights under the First Amendment, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Section 2000cc-1(a), and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed the claims with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court first held the 45-day registration requirement did not constitute a substantial burden on Plaintiff’s exercise of his Jewish faith under the RLUIPA, and therefore it also did not violate the First Amendment’s more lenient reasonableness standard. Second, the electronic posting of the 45-day registration requirement on the Jail’s computer kiosk, which he and other inmates used to communicate with Jail staff, provided adequate notice of the registration requirement to satisfy due process. The court explained that if a claim fails under the RLUIPA—which embeds a heightened standard for government restrictions of the free exercise of religion—it necessarily fails under the First Amendment. View "Bradley Dorman v. Chaplains Office BSO, et al" on Justia Law

In Defendant’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”), the probation officer determined that Jackson’s prior criminal history qualified him for an Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) sentencing enhancement. ACCA applies to a conviction under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g) for firearm possession by a prohibited person if the defendant has three qualifying convictions for “a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e)(1). Based on that conclusion, it sentenced Defendant to ACCA’s mandated fifteen-year minimum.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence. The court held that due-process fair-notice considerations require the court to apply the Controlled Substance Act Schedules in place when Defendant committed the offense for which he is being sentenced. At the times of Defendant’s cocaine-related prior offenses for which he sustained convictions under Fla. Stat. Section 893.13, the cocaine-related activity Section 893.13 criminalized categorically included activity involving ioflupane. Further, At the times of Defendant's prior cocaine-related state convictions, Fla. Stat. Section 893.13(a)(1)’s controlled-substance element was broader for cocaine-related offenses than ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition, so Defendant’s 1998 and 2004 cocaine-related convictions do not qualify as “serious drug offense[s].” The two Smith cases, Shular, and McNeill do not require the conclusion that Defendant’s prior cocaine-related convictions qualify as “serious drug offense[s].” Thus, because Defendant’s cocaine-related Section 893.13 offenses do not qualify as “serious drug offenses” under ACCA, the court vacated his sentence and remanded to the district court for sentencing without the ACCA enhancement. View "USA v. Eugene Jackson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a claim against Miami-Dade County under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). Plaintiff claimed she was a county employee and that the County abused the Program to save labor costs; the County argued that Plaintiff was never a county employee. As part of cross-motions, the parties stipulated that Plaintiff’s participation in the Program “solely to acquire “training in forensic photography.” The District Court determined that Plaintiff was an intern, not an employee, using the primary beneficiary test adopted by the Eleventh Circuit.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court first explained that Plaintiff does not qualify as a volunteer under the volunteer exception. Further, under the internship exception, an intern learning under an employer is not considered “employed” by the FLSA so long as the intern is the primary beneficiary of the relationship. To determine who the primary beneficiary of an intern-employer relationship is, the court looks to seven non-exhaustive factors.   Here, the facts show that Plaintiff learned forensic photography from a highly regarded county program for free and over a six-month period. And in participating in the Program, Plaintiff clearly understood that she would not be paid and that she was not entitled to a job with Miami-Dade County following her internship.  Further, Plaintiff gained both valuable practical experience and training from forensic photography professionals and Program assignments throughout the entirety of her participation. Likewise, the County’s receipt of some benefit from Plaintiff’s internship under the sixth factor does not transform the County into the primary beneficiary of its relationship with Plaintiff. View "Brandi McKay v. Miami-Dade County" on Justia Law

The appeals at issue involve two conceptually different causes of action against separate Defendants. These claims were pled together and tried to a jury empaneled for each claim. In one claim, Plaintiff, an at-will employee of a sheriff’s office, sued the sheriff, alleging that he made false and stigmatizing statements in terminating her employment that deprived her of a liberty interest in her reputation without affording her a post-termination hearing to clear her name in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the other claim, Plaintiff alleged that a sheriff’s office co-employee, whom she supervised, defamed her in violation of state tort law. The jury found for Plaintiff on both claims. Defendants’ appealed the judgments entered pursuant to the jury’s verdicts in No. 18-14808. In No. 19-13269, the sheriff appealed the judgment awarding Plaintiff an attorney’s fee on the claim brought against him.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment in No. 18-14808 and vacated and remand for further proceedings the judgment for attorney’s fee in No. 19-13269. The court held that because the defamation claim and the due process claim are unrelated, it was an error for the district court to consider the hours expended on the defamation claim in determining the lodestar. The court explained that Plaintiff had the burden of establishing the hours her attorneys spent in preparing for and prosecuting her due process claim against the Sheriff. Thus on remand, the district court must hold Plaintiff to her burden of proof so that it can identify the non-compensable hours and adjust the lodestar accordingly. View "Jacquelyn Johnston v. Gary S. Borders, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs—five organizations and two individual voters from Gwinnett County, Georgia—alleged that absentee ballot applications and voting-related information should have been, but were not, provided in both English and Spanish to voters in Gwinnett County during the 2020 election cycle. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit was tasked with determining whether Defendants—the Gwinnett County Board of Registrations and Elections, the Board’s individual members, and Georgia Secretary of State—violated Section 203 and Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. Section 10503, requires certain States and their political subdivisions to provide voting materials in languages in addition to English.The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing. Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded standing under a diversion of resources theory, and while some of Plaintiffs’ claims were moot, others remained live and amenable to meaningful relief from the court. The court, therefore, vacated the district court’s dismissal of the suit pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).The court held that the district court was correct, however, in concluding that Plaintiffs failed to state causes of action under either Section 203 or Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act and in not granting Plaintiffs leave to file their proposed supplemental complaint. The court, therefore, affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the suit pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and its denial of leave for Plaintiffs to file the supplemental complaint pursuant to Rule 15(d). View "Georgia Association of Latino Elected Officials, Inc., et al. v. Gwinnett County Board of Registration and Elections, et al." on Justia Law

After being stopped for driving without a license, removal proceedings were initiated against Petitioner. In response, Petitioner applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b which the Immigration Judge denied. Petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which “affirm[ed] the Immigration Judge’s decision on the ground that the respondent ha[d] not established that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives.”   Petitioner appealed on two separate but interrelated grounds: 1) that the BIA committed legal error in applying the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard and 2) that the BIA failed to render a reasoned decision. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition seeking cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b. The court held there was no legal or constitutional error in the decision of the BIA.   The court explained that because it cannot disturb factual findings, it is left to see if Petitioner identified any legal error with respect to the application of the law to those facts established in the BIA’s decision. The court found that Petitioner has not identified one. Turning to the second argument after reviewing the BIA’s opinion and Petitioner’s argument, the court did not see a legal argument for which it would have jurisdiction to review. As long as the BIA cites and proceeds to apply the proper legal standard, as it did in this case, the court cannot make legal error out of an inherently subjective determination of whether an applicant’s relatives will experience exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. View "Esteban Flores-Alonso v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Plaintiff retained an attorney of the Advocacy Law Firm to sue Defendants for alleged ADA violations following Plaintiff’s visit to Defendants’ place of business. The attorney has filed hundreds of lawsuits under the ADA on behalf of Plaintiff and others. As the prevailing party, Plaintiff  moved for attorney’s fees.. While the district court found that Plaintiff was entitled to attorney’s fees, the district court determined that the requested amount was grossly disproportionate given the case’s circumstances. The district court therefore reduced the requested fees.   Plaintiff argued that the district court abused its discretion in reducing the amount he requested for attorney’s fees.  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the award, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the attorney billed an excessive number of hours given the complexity of the case. The court noted that the attorney has been involved in hundreds of ADA lawsuits, including 140 during the case. Additionally, the district court found that the pleadings and motions filed here were “boilerplate” and much like filings in the attorney’s other ADA cases.   Further, the record reflects that the attorney was unduly litigious and engaged in unnecessary motion practice. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the attorney unnecessarily prolonged the litigation which, in turn, unnecessarily increased the amount of attorney’s fees. View "Howard Michael Caplan v. All American Auto Collision, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Dukes Clothing, LLC (“Dukes”) operated two clothing stores. As a result of the state orders and a customer’s exposure to COVID-19, Dukes was forced to close its doors. These closures resulted in lost business income for Dukes. Dukes’s insurer, The Cincinnati Insurance Company (“Cincinnati”), had issued an all-risk commercial insurance policy to Dukes. Dukes submitted a claim under its policy to recover its loss of business income due to its store closures caused by COVID-19. Cincinnati denied the claim on the basis that Dukes’s income loss was not caused by a direct physical loss or damage to the insured’s property.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims holding that Plaintiff’s income loss was not caused by a direct physical loss or damage to the insured’s property. The court explained that when examining insurance policies, Alabama courts consider the language of the policy as a whole, not in isolation. There are no Alabama appellate court decisions interpreting the relevant terms here—physical loss or damage—or interpreting these types of all-risk policies in the COVID-19 context so the court looked to its’ decisions interpreting nearly identical terms under Florida and Georgia law. Ultimately, the court found that since COVID-19 does not cause a “tangible alteration of the property” such that the property could not be used in the future or needed repairs to be used, lost business income resulting from COVID-19 could not constitute a “physical loss of or damage to” the property necessary for insurance coverage. View "Dukes Clothing, LLC v. The Cincinnati Insurance Company" on Justia Law