Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was arrested and indicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits an alien who "is illegally or unlawfully in the United States" from possessing a firearm. Defendant did not dispute that he possessed a firearm, but filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, claiming Section 922(g)(5)(A) violated his Second Amendment rights. The district court denied Defendant's motion, ultimately convicting him after a bench trial.Defendant appealed, arguing that because he lived in the United State prior to his arrest, he was among "the people" protected by the Second Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit rejected Defendant's argument, holding that the Second Amendment does not apply to all citizens. Under District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Second Amendment confers the right to gun ownership to individuals, not collectively. Thus, certain groups of people are constitutionally deprived of the right to own or possess a gun. Based on the Eleventh Circuit's "'examination of a variety of legal and other sources' from the Founding era," aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States are among those who are constitutionally restricted from owning or possessing a firearm. View "USA v. Ignacio Jimenez-Shilon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, NetChoice and the Computer & Communications Industry Association (together, “NetChoice”)—are trade associations that represent internet and social-media companies. They sued the Florida officials charged with enforcing S.B. 7072 under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. They sought to enjoin enforcement of Sections 106.072 and 501.2041 on a number of grounds, including, that the law’s provisions (1) violate the social-media companies’ right to free speech under the First Amendment and (2) are preempted by federal law.   The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it preliminarily enjoined those provisions of S.B. 7072 that are substantially likely to violate the First Amendment. But the district court did abuse its discretion when it enjoined provisions of S.B. 7072 that aren’t likely unconstitutional.   The court reasoned that it is substantially likely that social-media companies—even the biggest ones—are “private actors” whose rights the First Amendment protects, that their so-called “content-moderation” decisions constitute protected exercises of editorial judgment and that the provisions of the new Florida law that restrict large platforms’ ability to engage in content moderation unconstitutionally burden that prerogative. The court further concluded that it is substantially likely that one of the law’s particularly onerous disclosure provisions—which would require covered platforms to provide a “thorough rationale” for each and every content-moderation decision they make—violates the First Amendment. However, because it is unlikely that the law’s remaining disclosure provisions violate the First Amendment, the companies are not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief with respect to them. View "NetChoice, LLC, et al. v. Attorney General, State of Florida, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy and substantive health care fraud for fraudulently billing Medicare and Medicaid for millions of dollars for visits to nursing home patients that he never made. He challenged the convictions, sentence, restitution amount, and forfeiture amount on appeal. In an April 12, 2022 opinion, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence.Following the court's initial opinion, Defendant filed a petition for rehearing en banc. The Eleventh Circuit considered Defendant's petition as a petition for a panel rehearing. The court granted Defendant's petition, vacated its previous opinion and issued a revised opinion that did not change the court's judgment or Defendant's sentence. Defendant was given 21 days to file a supplemental brief. View "USA v. Douglas Moss" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s dismissal of their constitutional and state law claims against Defendants and its owner for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs are legal practitioners who reside in Florida and represent clients in personal injury cases. Defendant is a company is operated by an owner who resides in Florida.   Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated their right to due process of law by freezing their assets in Maryland, obtaining writs of garnishment based on Maryland law without providing notice and an opportunity to be heard. They also alleged violations of state law, including a charge of usury, breach of contract, and tortious interference. The district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs’ federal claim was so utterly frivolous that it robbed the court of federal question jurisdiction.   The sole issue before the Eleventh Circuit court was whether the district court erred in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims. The court reversed the district court’s ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ state and constitutional claims against Defendants. The court reasoned that Defendants have identified no case law suggesting that a plaintiff does not have a constitutionally protected interest in her property, even post-judgment.  Plaintiffs have plausibly raised an as-applied challenge to the use of Maryland’s garnishment statute, as opposed to a facial challenge, because they claim that the Maryland rules were applied in a way that unconstitutionally deprived them of their property. View "Diane N. Resnick, et al. v. KrunchCash, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 habeas petition. The Eleventh Circuit issued a certificate of appealability and concluded that the district court properly denied Section 2254 habeas petition. The court reviewed Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland. To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, the petitioner must show (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.   The court held that counsel’s failure to assert the failure-to-inform theory as trial court error in briefing Petitioner’s appeal could not amount to ineffective assistance under Strickland. The fact that Petitioner was concerned about a joint trial, not joint representation, fully supports the Florida District Court of Appeal (“DCA”) rejection of this ineffective assistance claim. The court reasoned that the trial court appropriately responded to Petitioner’s concern by explaining why Petitioner would not be prejudiced by a joint trial: because the State had charged Petitioner as a principal in the armed robbery, all of the evidence that would be introduced in co-defendant’s trial would be introduced in his as well.   Further, the district court correctly concluded that Petitioner failed to establish that the DCA’s affirmance of this ineffective assistance claim constituted an adjudication that was “contrary to, or an incorrect application of,” the Supreme Court’s holdings in Strickland. View "Gregory Lamar Blackmon v. Secretary, Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence of 168 months imprisonment followed by 30 years of supervised release, imposed pursuant to his guilty plea for child sex crimes. He challenged the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his bottom-of-the-guidelines sentence, arguing that the district court did not properly consider the 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) factors. He also contested the imposition of a special condition of supervised release prohibiting him—absent probation office approval—from using or possessing a computer or a device capable of connecting to the internet and from possessing an “electronic data storage medium.”   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the relevant factors or imposing a special condition of supervised release. The court reasoned that the district court did not commit any procedural errors. Here, the district court stated that it had considered the advisory guidelines and “all of the factors” set out in Section 3553(a)(1)– (7) and reliance on some Section 3553(a) factors over others does not necessarily render a sentence unreasonable.   Next, the court reasoned that the sentence was substantively reasonable because the district court imposed the lowest possible prison sentence within the range and it was within the district court’s discretion to weigh the factors as it did and arrive at this sentence. Finally, the court held that a district court has discretion to impose any condition of supervised release it deems appropriate so long as it comports with the factors enumerated in Section 3553(a). View "USA v. Blaine Joyner Coglianese" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a childhood victim of lead poisoning, assigned his rights to more than $900,000 in structured settlement payments to factoring companies for pennies on the dollar. However, as a result of the lead poisoning, Plaintiff lacked the capacity to understand the six structured settlement transfer agreements he entered into with the factoring companies—agreements that contained allegedly false statements about Plaintiff’s need for immediate funds and failed to disclose his limited mental capacity. Florida state courts—after holding hearings where Plaintiff was not present or represented, approved the six agreements based on the factoring companies’ incomplete set of facts. Plaintiff sued Defendants-appellees Transamerica Annuity Service Corporation and Transamerica Life Insurance Company (collectively, “Transamerica”), the companies that issued and funded his periodic payments before he assigned them to the factoring companies.   The Eleventh Circuit deferred its decision in Plaintiff’s breach of contract of claim, certifying to the New York Court of Appeals to answer: whether a plaintiff sufficiently alleges a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing if he demonstrates that the defendant drastically undermined a fundamental objective of the parties’ contract, even when the underlying duty at issue was not explicitly referred to in the writing? View "Lujerio Cordero v. Transamerica Annuity Service Corporation, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, several organizations and an individual, sued the City of Pensacola (“City”) and the Secretary of State of Florida (“Secretary”) in state court because the Pensacola City Council voted to remove a Confederate cenotaph from one of the City’s parks. The complaint included both federal and state constitutional claims, a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, and state statutory and common-law claims.   Plaintiffs appealed 1) the denial of leave to file a proposed amended complaint; 2) the District Court’s grant of the City’s and the Secretary’s motions to dismiss; 3) the District Court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration of remand back to state court.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaints against Defendants in state court with instructions for the District Court to remand this case back to state court. The court held that Plaintiffs do not have standing because their allegations do not amount to an injury under Article III. The court reasoned that standing requires Plaintiffs to allege enough facts to establish injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability. Here, most of Plaintiffs’ allegations of harm go only to the general disagreement with taking down the cenotaph and a general notion that such action by the government would violate their constitutional rights, both of which fall short of the concreteness standard under Gardner v. Mutz, 962 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2020) and Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986) respectively. View "Ladies Memorial Association, Inc., et al. v. City of Pensacola, Florida, et al." on Justia Law

Comegys, an independent insurance agency, had an independent contractor relationship with Safeco, a liability insurer. Comegys marketed Safeco insurance policies to the public. Comegys was allegedly negligent in procuring automobile insurance for one of its clients. Comegys had provided the client with an automobile insurance policy from Safeco, which the client eventually needed to rely on when he caused a car accident that ended in a motorcyclist’s death. Comegys offered to settle (and did settle through the errors and omissions policy it had with Endurance) the potential negligence claims the client had against it.   Relying on the indemnification provision between Safeco and Comegys, Endurance sued Safeco. Endurance wants to be indemnified by Safeco because the attorney Safeco provided to the client after the car accident pointed out the potential negligence claim the client had against Comegys.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s judgment finding in favor of Endurance’s claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court held that Safeco was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court reasoned that under Florida law, “[i]ndemnity contracts are subject to the general rules of contractual construction . . . [and] must be construed on the [express] intentions of the parties.” Here, there is no breach because Endurance never carried its burden at trial of explaining how Safeco breached the indemnification provision of the Limited Agreement. Further, Endurance did not argue that there is any express term of the Limited Agreement (besides the indemnification provision, which requires breach of an independent contract provision) that has been violated. View "Endurance American Specialty Insurance Company v. Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois, et al." on Justia Law

Global Marine Exploration, Inc. (“GME”), conducts marine salvage activities and discovers historic shipwreck sites in Florida’s coastal waters. GME entered into authorization agreements with the Florida Department of State (“FDOS”), to conduct salvage activities in Florida coastal wates. GME learned that FDOS was in contact with the Republic of France to recover the shipwreck sites. GME sued France, alleging claims for an in personam lien award, unjust enrichment, misappropriation of trade secret information, and interference with its rights and relations. France moved to dismiss GME’s amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). The district court agreed with France, finding that the FSIA’s commercial activity exception did not apply, and dismissed GME’s claims.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal and concluded that that the FSIA’s commercial activity exception applies and therefore the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over GME’s suit against France. The court reasoned that the nature of France’s activities here are commercial under the FSIA. France performed actions and entered into agreements with FDOS and others in connection with the shipwreck recovery project. These actions—fundraising, contracting with organizations and businesses to carry out excavations of shipwreck sites, and overseeing the logistics of the project—are commercial in nature and of the type negotiable among private parties. Further, FSIA’s commercial activity exception to foreign sovereign immunity applies because GME’s action is “based upon” France’s commercial activity in the United States. View "Global Marine Exploration, Inc., v. Republic of France" on Justia Law