Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against University officials, alleging that the University's policy requiring a permit to engage in public speech on the University's sidewalk violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Eleventh Circuit previously concluded, among other things, that plaintiff had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his case and agreed with the district court that the sidewalk at issue is a limited public forum and thus the University's permit requirement needed to be only reasonable and view-point neutral.In this appeal, after careful consideration and with the benefit of oral argument—and even assuming that the City of Tuscaloosa owns the sidewalk at issue—the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with plaintiff that any facts material to its analysis have changed. Accordingly, the court again concluded that the sidewalk is a limited public forum. The court also reviewed the permitting requirement and found that the policy provisions on leafletting were reasonable, and that plaintiff's actions do not fall within the "casual recreational and social activities" exception. The court concluded that the University's advance-notice requirement was reasonable where the University phrases the ten-day advance-notice period in terms of "should," not "must," and the record contains no evidence that the University has rejected an application simply because it was not submitted ten days before the event. Furthermore, the University's reasons for the advance-notice requirement are also reasonable, and the sidewalk is a limited public forum. Moreover, the policy permits the fast-tracking of a permit if an event relates to a current issue or responds to another event. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Keister v. Bell" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that John Doe, a pseudonymous student at Samford University, has not stated a claim against the university for a violation of Title IX, based on a university disciplinary board finding him responsible for sexual assault and suspending him for five years. The court concluded that the alleged facts do not permit a reasonable inference that the university discriminated against Doe "on the basis of sex" where the alleged procedural irregularities do not make sex discrimination plausible; the alleged public pressure and public statements do not make sex discrimination plausible; and the Clery statistics do not change the plausibility of the Title IX claim.The court also concluded that the Title IX claim failed under the Yusuf tests; nor has Doe satisfied the selective enforcement test. Finally, the court concluded that the appeal from the denial of the motion to proceed under a pseudonym is moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the university and dismissed as moot the appeal from the denial of the motion to proceed under a pseudonym. View "Doe v. Samford University" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for cancellation of removal. The court agreed with petitioner that he satisfied his burden of demonstrating his eligibility for cancellation of removal for certain lawful permanent residents because his violation of Fla. Stat. 893.13(6)(a) did not relate to a controlled substance, as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802, and thus did not prevent him from accruing the necessary seven-year period of continuous residence.The court explained that, because a violation of section 893.13(6)(a) did not relate to a controlled substance as defined under federal law, petitioner's conviction under this statute in 2017 did not affect his ability to accrue the required seven years of continuous eligibility necessary for cancellation of removal. Rather, petitioner's residence "clock" stopped in 2019 when he was arrested for fleeing and eluding while lights and sirens were activated. The court explained that, at this point in time, petitioner had lived in the United States continuously for eight years, thereby meeting the residency requirement under INA 240A. View "Fuad Fares Fuad Said v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the 2020 indictment on double jeopardy grounds and therefore affirmed the district court. Defendant was acquitted of solicitation and advertisement for child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(d)(1), but charged with attempting to employ, use, persuade, induce, entice and coerce a person whom he believed to be a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing visual depictions of such conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). Defendant asserts that the district court erred because section 2251(d) does not require proof of any fact beyond what is required for a section 2251(a) conviction. However, the court concluded that section 2251(a) and section 2251(d) each require proof of an additional fact that the other offense does not. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of tipped employees at Nusret, filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), challenging Nusret's compensation scheme. Plaintiffs alleged that from November 1, 2017, through January 18, 2019, the restaurant paid them less than the required federal minimum and overtime wages and forced them to participate in an illegal tip pool with non-tipped employees.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Nusret's mandatory 18% "service charge" is not a tip under the FLSA and associated regulations and could lawfully be used to offset Nusret's wage obligations under the FLSA. The court agreed with the district court that the mandatory service charge was a bona fide service charge and not a tip because it was a compulsory charge for service, and the decision to pay it—and the amount to pay—were not determined solely by the customer. The court declined to reach the merits of plaintiffs' remaining arguments and affirmed the district court's award of summary judgment in favor of Nusret. View "Compere v. Nusret Miami, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss his complaint, seeking judicial review of the USCIS's denial of a national interest waiver pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(2)(B)(i), based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that section 1153(b)(2)(B)(i) specifies that a national interest waiver is within the discretion of the Attorney General, and therefore section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review. Accordingly, the district court did not err by dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Brasil v. Secretary, Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's determination that petitioner was removeable. The IJ concluded that petitioner's conviction for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, Fla. Stat. 810.02(3)(b), is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).The court explained that Florida has applied section 810.02(3)(b) to a dwelling which was not occupied prior to or after the entry, State v. Bennett, 565 So. 2d 803, 805 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), and that application impacts whether a violation of section 810.02(3)(b) is a CIMT. However, neither the IJ nor the BIA address petitioner's impact of Bennett here. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for the BIA to address Bennett under the realistic probability component of the categorical approach. View "Lauture v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus vacating petitioner's convictions for murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping with bodily injury. Of the twelve claims presented to the Circuit Court, only the first five challenged petitioner's conviction and thus are relevant here. Claims I and III incorporated numerous subclaims: Claim I had three subclaims, while Claim III had eight subclaims denoted A through H, with Claim III-H having an additional five subclaims of its own. Claim III-H-4, which provided the principal basis for the writ of habeas corpus the district court issued, alleged that the prosecutor failed to disclose to the defense as required by Brady v. Maryland the handwritten notes he made of a pretrial conversation he had with two named individuals.The court concluded that petitioner failed to exhaust Claim III-H-4 in the state courts because he failed to present the claim to the Florida Supreme Court such that the reasonable reader would understand the claim's particular legal basis and specific factual foundation. Furthermore, the district court's issuance of the writ based on a witness's statement constituted reversible error. The court considered the remaining claims and affirmed the district court's denial of relief as to petitioner's cross-appeal. View "Green v. Secretary, Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's sua sponte remand and therefore denied the petition for permission to appeal under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Plaintiffs, a group of current and former mobile homeowners and their homeowners' association, filed this action in Florida state court against numerous defendants, alleging violations of the Florida Antitrust Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. After removal to federal court, the district court sua sponte remanded back to state court, reasoning that federal-question jurisdiction no longer existed because the amended complaint asserted only state law claims and that CAFA did not provide jurisdiction because a claim brought in a representative capacity under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.222 "is not a class action, as that term is understood for CAFA jurisdiction."The court concluded that when a court sua sponte orders a remand, it is not "granting" its own "motion" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1453(c)(1)—any more than it would be "denying" its own motion in the absence of such an order. Because the remand in this case was not ordered upon the motion of any party, the court concluded that section 1453(c)(1)'s exception does not apply here. View "Ruhlen v. Holiday Haven Homeowners, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants Bramwell, Howard, and Stone were convicted of crimes involving the millions of dollars that Tricare paid Howard for filling compounded cream prescriptions for patients. Bramwell wrote the vast majority of those prescriptions, and Stone helped in recruiting some of the patients for whom Howard filled prescriptions. Defendants were convicted for paying or receiving kickbacks and conspiring to do it. Howard was also convicted of laundering some of the proceeds.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support defendants' convictions. In this case, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Howard paid, and Bramwell received kickbacks and that they conspired to do so; that Howard paid, and Stone received, kickbacks and that they conspired to do so; and that Howard laundered money. The court also concluded that there was no constructive amendment to the indictment. However, the court concluded that Bramwell's sentence of probation is substantively unreasonable where the district court clearly erred in weighing the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. Accordingly, the court vacated Bramwell's sentence and remanded for further proceedings. The court otherwise affirmed the judgments. View "United States v. Howard" on Justia Law