Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After an arbitrator interpreted a collective bargaining agreement to require Warrior Met Coal Mining to establish just cause to discharge an employee for violating the agreement's four-strike attendance policy, and the arbitrator determined that just cause was not present, the district court vacated the arbitrator's award as contrary to the agreement.The Eleventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the arbitrator arguably interpreted the agreement and the court must defer to his interpretation. The court distinguished Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company v. United Steelworkers, 996 F.2d 279 (11th Cir. 1993), from the circumstances here and concluded that, in this case, the arbitrator relied on past practices to give meaning to the attendance policy. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the union. View "Warrior Met Coal Mining, LLC v. United Mine Workers of America" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging race discrimination after defendant terminated plaintiff. The court concluded that the district court properly found that plaintiff failed to show that defendant engaged in race discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework. However, in the alternative, plaintiff provided a convincing mosaic of discrimination sufficient to survive summary judgment at this stage. In this case, plaintiff has met his burden of showing factual disputes that should be decided by a jury—a jury whose role it is to weigh conflicting evidence and make any necessary credibility determinations. Therefore, the court remanded for further consideration. View "Jenkins v. Nell" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order dismissing, based on lack of standing, plaintiffs' action alleging that Sea Island did not comply with the Clean Water Act’s permitting process. The court concluded that Plaintiff Fraser adequately alleged a concrete injury to her aesthetic interest in the wetland and therefore the court need not address plaintiffs' remaining arguments. In this case, Fraser adequately alleged that she suffered an injury to her aesthetic interests in the wetland because she has viewed the wetland, derived aesthetic pleasure from its natural habitat and vegetation, and now derives less pleasure from the unnatural grasses and lawn placed on the wetland. Therefore, Fraser's allegations are sufficient to establish an injury in fact at this stage, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "The Glynn Environmental Coalition, Inc. v. Sea Island Acquisition, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's interlocutory order denying defendant's motion to compel arbitration. Defendant argues that the parties should be required to arbitrate their dispute under the terms of a 2018 Settlement Agreement entered into between her and plaintiff. The court agreed with plaintiff that the district court correctly denied the motion to compel arbitration after finding that the parties mutually rescinded the 2018 Settlement Agreement in 2019 under Florida law. The court found instructive Dasher v. RBC Bank (USA), 745 F.3d 1111 (11th Cir. 2014), which held that arbitration could not be compelled based on an earlier agreement containing an arbitration clause when a subsequent agreement without an arbitration clause entirely superseded the earlier agreement under state law. Furthermore, the district court's credibility determinations are supported, not contradicted, by the objective evidence in this case, and so its findings of fact are untouchable on appeal. View "Reiterman v. Abid" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's negligence claims against Carnival based on failure to state a claim. Plaintiff alleged claims for negligent failure to maintain and negligent failure to warn after she slipped and fell on a wet substance near the bar onboard a Carnival cruise ship. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to include any factual allegations that were sufficient to satisfy the Iqbal and Twombly pleading standards such that it is facially plausible that Carnival had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. Rather, the court concluded that plaintiff's complaint contains only conclusory allegations as to actual or constructive notice. Finally, because plaintiff never sought leave to amend the complaint, there was no error in granting leave sua sponte before dismissing the complaint. View "Newbauer v. Carnival Corp." on Justia Law

Heather operated a health-coaching business called Constitution Nutrition. She started her business in California, which did not require a license. After moving to Florida in 2015, she continued to run her business—meeting online with most of her clients and meeting in person with two clients who lived in Florida. She described herself as a “holistic health coach” and not as a dietician. Heather tailored her health coaching to each client, which included dietary advice. After a complaint was filed against her and she paid $500.00 in fines and $254.09 in investigatory fees, Heather sued, claiming that Florida’s Dietetics and Nutrition Practice Act, which requires a license to practice as a dietician or nutritionist, violated her First Amendment free speech rights to communicate her opinions and advice on diet and nutrition to her clients. The district court granted the Florida Department of Health summary judgment.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, after considering the Supreme Court’s decision in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (2018). The Act “is a professional regulation with a merely incidental effect on protected speech,” and is constitutional under the First Amendment. View "Del Castillo v. Secretary, Florida Department of Health" on Justia Law

Zarate, a citizen of Mexico, was convicted of violating 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B) for using a social security card that was not his. An IJ ruled that Zarate was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because his conviction under section 408(a)(7)(B) was for a “crime involving moral turpitude” (CIMT), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2); 1229b(b)(1)(c) but otherwise would have granted him that relief. The BIA dismissed his appeal, reasoning that section 408(a)(7)(B) requires intent to deceive.The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded, noting that the circuits are divided on the issue. While a conviction for a violation of section 408(a)(7)(B) may be a CIMT, the BIA must apply its two-pronged moral turpitude standard and decide whether the statute, under the categorical approach, involves conduct that is “reprehensible,” i.e., conduct that is “inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general.” Previous BIA decisions indicate that making a false statement or engaging in general deception is not necessarily the same thing as fraud; non-fraud offenses involving deception are not automatically CIMTs. View "Zarate v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

An online promotions team posted thousands of videos to persuade people to buy BitConnect Coin, a new cryptocurrency. BitConnect coin was not a sound investment; it was a Ponzi scheme. BitConnect’s original investors received “returns” from the money paid by new investors. The promoters were siphoning off money. At one point, BitConnect was bringing in around $10 million per week in investments from the United States.Two victims of the BitConnect collapse filed a putative class action, alleging that the promoters were liable under section 12 of the Securities Act for selling unregistered securities through their BitConnect videos, 15 U.S.C. 77l(a)(1); 77e(a)(1). The district court dismissed because the plaintiffs based their case on interactions with the promoters’ “publicly available content,” the plaintiffs had never received a “personal solicitation” from the promoters. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. Neither the Securities Act nor precedent imposes that kind of limitation. Solicitation has long occurred through mass communications, and online videos are merely a new way of doing an old thing. The Securities Act provides no free pass for online solicitations. View "Parks v. BitConnect International PLC" on Justia Law

Pincus’s vehicle was photographed running a red light in North Miami Beach. His notice of violation stated that he owed a statutory penalty of $158 and that if Pincus paid online or by phone, he would be charged an additional convenience fee. Pincus paid online with a credit card and was required to pay both the statutory penalty and the convenience fee. Pincus brought a putative class action against ATS, the vendor that operated the city’s red-light enforcement program. He alleged that several Florida statutes barred ATS from charging the convenience fee and that ATS was unjustly enriched by retaining the fee. The district court dismissed Pincus’s complaint,The Eleventh Circuit certified questions to the Supreme Court of Florida, which explained that a claim for unjust enrichment under Florida law required Pincus to allege that “it was inequitable for ATS to retain” the convenience fee. Even assuming Florida law barred ATS from charging the fee, the court concluded, it was “not inequitable” for ATS to retain the fee because Pincus received “value in exchange,” including not having to procure postage and a check or money order; being able to pay the balance over time; avoiding the risk of payment being delayed, stolen, or lost; being afforded more time because his payment would be received instantaneously; and receiving immediate confirmation of payment. The Eleventh Circuit, in response, affirmed the dismissal. View "Pincus v. American Traffic Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

One of the mandatory conditions of Dennis’s probation for stealing social security funds was that she not commit any new state crimes. A police officer later investigated Dennis for theft of services after he suspected that she took food from a restaurant without paying. During a heated exchange with the officer, Dennis repeatedly disobeyed his commands. Based on this encounter, a probation officer provided written notice that Dennis had committed theft, battery, and felony obstruction.After a hearing, the district court found that Dennis committed misdemeanor obstruction and sentenced her to a term of supervised release. Dennis objected to that sentence on the ground that she had not been given written notice that her probation could be revoked for committing misdemeanor obstruction. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Because misdemeanor obstruction is a lesser included offense of felony obstruction, the inclusion of felony obstruction in the petition “thereby g[ave] notice to the defendant that [s]he may be [found guilty] on either charge.” The notice given to Dennis satisfied the requirements of “due process of law.” View "United States v. Dennis" on Justia Law