Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and his wife were passengers on a cruise aboard a ship operated by Defendant. A verbal altercation between Plaintiff and another passenger ensued and while the security officer turned to speak to Plaintiff, the other passenger punched Plaintiff in the face.   Plaintiff alleged that Defendant was negligent because it failed to (a) reasonably and properly train security personnel; (b) have adequate security measures, including adequate security presence and surveillance cameras; (c) warn him of the danger of being physically assaulted while onboard the vessel; (d) promulgate and enforce policies and procedures designed to prevent passengers from physically assaulting other passengers; and (e) exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, ruling that there was no evidence suggesting that Defendant had actual or constructive notice of the risk of harm.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Defendant and denied Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions. The court held that Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether Defendant had actual notice that any passengers would attack him. The court reasoned that in the context of passenger-on-passenger violence, a cruise line has a duty to warn and/or protect when it or its employees reasonably apprehend the danger such that the attack was foreseeable. However, while the presence of a security officer during disembarkation connotes some awareness of the importance of order, a verbal dispute does not provide actual notice that a physical assault is to follow. View "Reinier Fuentes v. Classica Cruise Operator Ltd, Inc." on Justia Law

The dispute arose out of a contract between Purple Shovel and two companies Omnipol and Elmex Praha (“Elmex”), for the manufacture and delivery of AK-47 assault rifles. The U.S. Special Operations Command (“SOCOM”) entered into a contract (the “SOCOM contract”) with Purple Shovel to deliver the rifles for a set price. Together, the parties entered into a “Cooperation Agreement.”   Purple Shovel never paid Elmex and, in turn, Elmex failed to pay Omnipol. Plaintiffs brought an action against several individuals allegedly involved in the formation of the two contracts and asserted six claims against Defendants. The District Court dismissed the amended complaint on all counts and with respect to all Defendants.   On appeal, Plaintiffs challenged the district court’s substitution of the United States as a party in the place of the civilian employees. They also challenged the district court’s finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the state law claims due to the bar of sovereign immunity.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s amended complaint. The court held that the district court was correct in concluding both that no additional discovery was needed on the scope-of-employment issue and that the United States had been properly substituted as Defendant. Further, the district court did not err in dismissing the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Omnipol, A.S., et al. v. Christopher Worrell, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Speech First, is a voluntary membership organization dedicated to protecting students’ free-speech rights. It represents students who attend universities across the country, including the University of Central Florida (“UCF”). Several of Speech First’s UCF-based members have attested that they desire to express their beliefs and opinions about a range of topics but are inhibited from doing so by two University policies referred to as the “discriminatory- harassment” and “bias-related-incidents” policies. Shortly after filing suit, Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction, which the district court denied.The Eleventh Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part the district court’s decision denying Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction in its First Amendment violation claim against the University of Central Florida. The court held Plaintiff has standing to sue because the challenged policies chill its members’ speech and that the discriminatory-harassment policy likely violates the First Amendment.  Further, because the district court never considered the bias-related-incidents policy’s constitutionality on the merits—having erroneously concluded that Speech First lacked standing to challenge it, the court remanded for a determination of that issue.   The court reasoned that the discriminatory harassment and bias-related-incident policies objectively chill speech because its operation would cause a reasonable student to fear expressing potentially unpopular beliefs. Further, the court concluded that Plaintiff is substantially likely to establish that the discriminatory-harassment policy is both (1) impermissibly overbroad and (2) content and viewpoint-based restriction of speech. View "Speech First, Inc. v. Alexander Cartwright" on Justia Law

Petitioner a native and citizen of North Macedonia, appealed the dismissal or, alternatively, the denial of his 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241 habeas petition seeking release from an alleged “unlawful and indefinite” detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Petitioner claimed that his detention by ICE officials violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, because it exceeded the “presumptively reasonable” 180-day period established in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). The district court denied Petitioner relief, concluding, among other things, that the delay in his removal did not violate Zadvydas because Petitioner had sought and obtained an administrative stay of his removal proceedings.   The Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Petitioner’s habeas petition seeking release and dismissed the case as moot. The court reasoned that it need not decide whether the voluntary cessation doctrine applies in the habeas immigration context because even if it did, it has not been satisfied. Further, the government has described Petitioner’s detention as having “ceased,” and, as of now, more than fifteen months have passed since Petitioner was released. Thus, the court found that there is no reasonable basis for it to believe that Peitioner will be re-detained unlawfully upon the termination of his suit. View "Goga Djadju v. Juan A. Lopez Vega, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Florida pretrial defendant awaiting trial on state criminal charges, filed a petition in federal court alleging that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated as a result of temporary measures suspending criminal jury trials in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. He sought the dismissal of all of his criminal charges, traveling under the federal habeas provision found in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim, finding that Petitioner gave the court no basis for intervening in his state criminal prosecution. The court held that it cannot say that Petitioner’s speedy-trial filings, which expressly referenced only the Florida rule, fairly raised a federal constitutional speedy-trial claim. Further, there is not any indication that the state court somehow surmised that Petitioner had raised a federal constitutional claim-it never discussed the Sixth Amendment claim, even implicitly.   Further, the court held that Petitioner’s petition is barred under the application of the abstention doctrine under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The court reasoned that Younger established that, based on principles of comity and federalism, a federal court should not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings where the state court conviction and/or sentence is not yet final. View "James Russell Johnson v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, possessing methamphetamine and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. On appeal, he raised five claims as to why he should either receive a new trial or, alternatively, be resentenced.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction holding that Defendant did not experience a cumulative error required to reverse a jury trial verdict. The court concluded that the only errors it identified were invited errors with respect to the jury instruction and potential harmless error with respect to the handling of the records of conviction.   The court reasoned that while the special agent’s misconduct in handling evidence in a previous case was egregious enough for him to be barred from bringing cases in at least one United States Attorney’s Office, it is not clear that the failure to disclose his prior mishandling of evidence would serve to render this trial unfair. Further, the court found that Defendant’s contentions sought to impermissibly heighten the probable cause standard to require officers to have perfect memory as to why they stopped an individual. Finally, the court held that Defendant cannot show that his trial outcome would have been different if all these supposed errors had not been made. View "USA v. Freddie Clark" on Justia Law

In 2018, Defendant entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine and one kilogram or more of heroin. Defendant's role in the conspiracy was to deliver the narcotics to customers and by making narcotics sales at a stash house. At his arrest, Defendant had a key to the stash house in his possession.The pre-sentence report ("PSR") determined that the base offense level was 36. The PSR also suggested various enhancements, including a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G Sec. 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a house for the purposes of manufacturing or distributing narcotics. Applying the Sec. 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement, the district court sentenced Defendant to 120 months of incarceration.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence, finding that the district court did not err in applying a two-level enhancement for maintaining a drug premises or by denying safety valve relief. When determining the applicability of a Sec. 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement, the court looks to whether a defendant had a possessory interest in the premises and the extent to which they controlled access to the premises. Here, although Defendant did not own or live at the stash house for the entire duration of the conspiracy, he lived at the house for at least some portion of the conspiracy. Additionally, although the district court erred in concluding the application of the 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement barred Defendant from safety valve relief, Defendant was not entitled to relief because he failed to cooperate against his codefendants. View "USA v. Trini Thomas, Jr." on Justia Law

Speech First, Inc. (“Speech First”) filed a lawsuit against the University of Central Florida (“University”) arguing that Defendant’s discriminatory-harassment and bias-related-incidents policies violate the First Amendment. Specifically, Speech First contended that the policies are unconstitutionally overbroad and the discriminatory-harassment policy restricts speech based on viewpoint and content. The district court held that Speech First lacked Article III standing to challenge the policies.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part, holding that Speech First has standing to sue and the discriminatory-harassment policy likely violates the First Amendment on the grounds that it is an overbroad and content- and viewpoint-based regulation of constitutionally protected expression. The court explained that Speech First has standing to challenge both policies at issue because the policies objectively chill its members’ speech. Further, the court found that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to preliminarily enjoin the discriminatory-harassment policy and that the district court should determine in the first instance whether Speech First is entitled to a preliminary injunction of the bias-related-incidents policy. View "Speech First, Inc. v. Alexander Cartwright" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g) and 924(a)(2). He argued that the district court did not elicit objections as required by United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1990).   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The court explained that under Jones, a district court must fully articulate objections to the court’s ultimate findings and conclusions of law following the imposition of a sentence. Here, the court found that the district court did not follow the procedures set forth in Jones. It explained that during the sentencing hearing, no one addressed the firearm being stolen from a police department. Rather, when read together, the allegations explained that the gun in question was reported stolen in the sheriff’s office county, not that it was stolen from the sheriff. Because the district court first announced this conclusion after the sentencing hearing when it issued the written document, the district court did not provide Defendant an opportunity to object to its finding as to the victim of the theft.   The court noted that in most cases a discrepancy between a court’s real-time pronouncement and later-filed form would not support a Jones claim. However, here, the district court failed to fully state its basis for departing during the sentencing hearing. Thus, in this situation, the post-sentencing form exposed an error. View "USA v. Karijmah Tremaine Mosely" on Justia Law

While investigating a suspected drug trafficking conspiracy, a Georgia Bureau of Investigation agent secured a wiretap authorization order from a state judge. The wiretap ultimately implicated nine people in the conspiracy. When federal authorities prosecuted them based on this state-gathered evidence, the defendants asked the district court to suppress it. The district court denied their motions, the defendants pleaded guilty to federal drug crimes, and each defendant expressly reserved his suppression arguments for appeal.The defendants argue that the recordings were never properly sealed both because the judge did not issue a separate, written sealing order after receiving the recordings and because the government “maintained access” to the original recordings after sealing. The court found that the state judge properly sealed the wiretap recordings, reasoning that the recordings were “made available to the [authorizing] judge” and “sealed under his directions.” No one accessed them after they were physically sealed.Further, Section 2518(8)(a) requires that the recordings be sealed “[i]mmediately upon the expiration of the period of the order or extensions thereof.” The statute states that a delay in sealing should be excused if the government provides a “satisfactory explanation” for the delay. Considering the absence of tampering, the government’s good faith, the short delay, the lack of tactical advantage to the government or prejudice to the defendants, and the objective reasonableness of the agents’ actions, the court found that the government provided a satisfactory explanation for any delay in sealing. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling. View "USA v. Mario Demitric Stowers" on Justia Law