Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Secure intending to open an Illinois coal gasification plant, contracted with Siemens. Secure would buy gasification equipment on a payment plan; Siemens would provide updates and repairs to the equipment. The price of natural gas fell in 2009. Secure had to change its business plan and could not keep up with its payments to Siemens. In 2010, other clients discovered problems with Siemens’s gasification equipment. Siemens began implementing substantial modifications to its gasifiers. Because Secure's plant was not operational, Siemens left Secure out of the loop. In 2015, Siemens decided to exit the gasification market but promised to continue supporting its existing projects, including Secure’s, which had never been opened or used.In 2016, Secure sued Siemens, alleging fraud- and contract-based claims. Siemens, which was still owed 13 million dollars under the contract, filed a breach of contract counterclaim. Years into the litigation, the court denied Secure leave to amend its complaint, then excluded Secure’s expert witness for relying on an unreliable methodology, and granted Siemens summary judgment on Secure’s claims. Before trial on Siemens’s counterclaim, the court excluded Secure's evidence in support of its breach-of-contract affirmative defense. The jury returned a full verdict in Siemens’s favor. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Secure’s expert witness and its trial evidence and did not err in granting Siemens summary judgment. View "MidAmerica C2L Inc. v. Siemens Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

Williams pled guilty to distribution of crack cocaine within 1,000 feet of a housing facility and school, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 860(a). He stipulated that the drug quantity attributable to him for calculating his guideline range was more than 500 milligrams but less than one gram of crack cocaine. In 2007, the district court sentenced Williams to 200 months. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Williams’s projected release date is August 4, 2022.In 2019, Williams moved to reduce his sentence. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion, rejecting an argument that Williams was eligible for relief under the First Step Act because his 21 U.S.C. 860(a) drug distribution conviction was a “covered offense” under section 404(a), given that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, modified section 860(a) by modifying the statute it cross-references, 21 U.S.C. 841(b). Williams was not sentenced for a covered offense because the penalties for his offense, defined by 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) and 860(a), were not modified by the Fair Sentencing Act. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Enacted after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), creates a comprehensive remedial scheme that governs—and apportions liability for—oil-removal costs. OPA holds oil spillers strictly liable upfront for oil-removal expenses and allows them, if they meet certain requirements, to avail themselves of one of three liability defenses and to seek contribution from other culpable parties. The M/V SAVAGE VOYAGER was transporting oil through a Mississippi waterway when an accident at a boat lift— operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—caused a rupture in the SAVAGE VOYAGER’s hull, through which thousands of gallons of oil poured into the river.The owners of the vessel sued the United States, not under the OPA, but under the common-law admiralty regime. They cited the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA), a 1920 law by which Congress generally waived sovereign immunity for most admiralty claims. The interplay between the OPA and the SAA was an issue of first impression in the federal courts. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the vessel owner’s claims for removal costs. OPA authorizes no claim against the government for oil-removal damages and OPA’s comprehensive remedial scheme displaced the SAA’s more general sovereign-immunity waiver. View "Savage Services Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant, a police sergeant who was at the wrong house because of imprecise dispatch directions, shot and killed William David Powell, who was innocent of any crime and standing in his driveway. Powell was holding a pistol because he and his wife thought they had heard a prowler. Powell's wife filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against defendant in his individual capacity, alleging that he violated her husband's constitutional right to be free from excessive force.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, concluding that plaintiff has not identified case law with materially similar facts or with a broad statement of principle giving defendant fair notice that he had to warn Powell at the earliest possible moment and before using deadly force. Therefore, she has not met her burden of showing qualified immunity is not appropriate. The court stated that plaintiff has not shown that defendant's actions were unreasonable for qualified immunity purposes. View "Powell v. Snook" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant based on qualified immunity in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. Plaintiff alleged that defendant violated her right to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because there was no longer probable cause to support her detention when the perpetrator said, "[T]hat's not her." The court concluded that plaintiff cannot prove that defendant violated her constitutional rights for three reasons: first, plaintiff's continued detention was supported by probable cause; second, defendant was entitled to rely on a facially valid and lawfully obtained warrant; and third, defendant did not take an affirmative action to continue the prosecution. View "Washington v. Howard" on Justia Law

The district court found that Southern Coal had breached a contract with Drummond to transfer and store coal and awarded Drummond $6,860,000. Drummond appealed, arguing that the district court erred in finding a price escalation clause in the contract unenforceable. Southern Coal argued that Drummond’s actions excused Southern Coal’s obligation to pay Drummond under the contract. Both parties challenged the district’s court determination not to award attorneys’ fees to either party.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of $6,860,000. The district court correctly found that Southern Coal was not excused from performing under the contract and that the price escalation clause was unenforceable. Southern’s anticipatory repudiation argument lacked merit. The “root” of the Agreement was that Drummond would provide throughput services to Southern Coal. At no point did Drummond indicate that it would not perform that obligation. The district court correctly found the Agreement ambiguous and declined to reform the contract with respect to the price benchmarking clause. The court remanded for the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party, Drummond. View "Southern Coal Corp. v. Drummond Coal Sales, Inc." on Justia Law

A teacher smelled marijuana burning in the classroom and alerted Principal Stamps and Assistant Principal Byars, who searched the belongings of every student in the class. They found marijuana stems and seeds, rolling paper, lighters, and assorted pills in T.R.’s backpack. T.R. denied smoking marijuana in the classroom that day. T.R. contends that during a first search, in a room with only Stamps and Counselor Dean, she removed her clothing, lifted her breasts, and bent over for an inspection while a window in the office, leading to a public hallway, remained uncovered. School officials did not find any drugs on T.R.’s person. T.R. alleges that school officials later again directed her to remove her clothing and she submitted. T.R. stated that she was on her menstrual cycle, which made her feel “humiliated.” T.R.’s teacher found the remains of the marijuana cigarette under T.R.’s desk the next day.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court found that the school officials were entitled to qualified immunity and the Defendants’ conduct was not extreme and outrageous. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. To grant qualified immunity on these facts "would severely diminish the protections afforded students from strip searches" set out in Supreme Court precedent. Considering the degree of intrusiveness of the search and that school officials searched her twice, T.R.’s claim for outrage creates a sufficient question for the jury. View "T.R. v. Lamar County Board of Education" on Justia Law

Couch falsely represented that he was not HIV positive. Jackson issued Couch a $500,000 life insurance policy. At the time, HIV-positive individuals had a greatly diminished life expectancy, resulting in high demand for HIV-positive insureds willing to engage in viatical settlements. Couch worked with a brokerage, which, months later, found a purchaser, Crum. The premiums were paid through the broker's premium reserve fund until after the two-year contestability period policy expired. Crum paid the premium for eight more years, letting the policy lapse in 2009. In 2016, Crum learned that Couch had died in 2005 and made a claim.Jackson sought a declaration that, under Georgia law, the policy was void as an illegal human life wagering contract. The district court found that Couch took out the policy with the intent to sell it to one without an insurable interest and that the policy was unenforceable as an illegal human life wagering contract under Georgia law. Crum argued that an illegal human life wagering contract involves the knowing, direct involvement of an identified third-party beneficiary at the time of its procurement. The Eleventh Circuit certified, to the Georgia Supreme Court, the question: whether a life insurance policy is void if it is procured by an individual on his own life for the sole purpose of selling the policy to a third party without an insurable interest in the insured, but without the complicity of the ultimate purchaser at the time of procurement. View "Jackson National Life Insurance Co. v. Crum" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased tickets for Defendant’s commercial flights from Miami to Venezuela. Plaintiffs allege that their ticket prices reflected the “fully-paid contract” and that Defendant failed to sufficiently disclose any other fees required for passage. When checking in for their flights at the airport, however, Defendant informed Plaintiffs that they had to pay an additional $80 “Exit Fee” before being allowed to board their flights. Plaintiffs filed a breach of contract putative class action.The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that the Airline Deregulation Act preempted Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim because it related to the price of the airline ticket and the Act’s preemption provision identifies actions relating to price as preempted. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, first holding that the Plaintiffs plausibly alleged facts that would establish diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim seeks merely to enforce the parties’ private agreements regarding the cost of passage and does not invoke state laws or regulations to alter the agreed-upon price. The statute, 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1), provides: “[A] State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier..” The suit falls within the category of cases protected from preemption by Supreme Court precedent. View "Cavalieri v. Avior Airlines C.A." on Justia Law

Hardwick helped found a law firm, MHS. MHS later sold part of its foreclosure operation. Hardwick received $14-$15 million in compensation. Hardwick lost the money and owed millions in loans, many for gambling debts. When a bank and a casino sued him, Hardwick lied to a different bank in a line-of-credit application. In addition, in 2011-2014, Hardwick siphoned off about $26.5 million from MHS; $19 million came from trust accounts. Hardwick relied heavily on Maurya, who initially worked as an MHS controller. Hardwick promoted Maurya to CFO, giving her broad authority over the trust accounts. At Hardwick’s request, she repeatedly sent money from MHS to Hardwick or his creditors and significantly underreported the distributions. After a 2014 internal audit, Hardwick was convicted of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and making false statements to a federally insured financial institution and was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment—an upward variance from the Guidelines range of 108-135 months. Maurya received a sentence of 84 months. A restitution order required Maurya and Hardwick to pay, jointly and severally, $40,307,431.00.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the restitution order as not supported by the reasoning required by law; affirmed Hardwick’s convictions and sentence; and vacated Maurya’s sentence. The district court violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by applying the 2018 Guidelines, which included a two-level substantial financial hardship enhancement added in 2015, after Maurya’s offense. View "United States v. Maurya" on Justia Law