Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Chamu, born in Mexico, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1990. In 2003, he was pleaded guilty to cocaine possession under Florida law; 14 years later, in removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(I), Chamu applied for cancellation of removal, alleging that his mother and children would suffer exceptional hardship.Cancellation is unavailable for those who have been convicted of a state offense “relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21)” of the U.S. Code, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C), 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Section 802 defines “controlled substance” as any substance included in federal controlled substance schedules. Chamu unsuccessfully sought to have his Florida cocaine possession conviction vacated, then argued that the Florida statute was too broad to bar his cancellation request. The IJ and BIA rejected his argument, reasoning that Chamu had not shown a realistic probability that the Florida statute would be enforced more broadly than the federal statutes. The Eleventh Circuit agreed. Florida’s definition of cocaine may not be completely consistent with the federal definition but Chamu failed to prove that it covers more substances. No illicit-nature mens rea is necessary to trigger removal consequences for offenses listed under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). View "Chamu v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Reeves is scheduled to be executed in January 2022. Alabama Act 2018-353 gave “death row inmates a single opportunity to elect that their execution be carried out by" nitrogen hypoxia, instead of Alabama’s default method, lethal injection. Reeves had until June 30, 2018, to elect nitrogen hypoxia in writing. An election form was distributed to every death row inmate. Reeves made no election. In 2020, Reeves filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, alleging that “with IQ scores in the upper 60s and low 70s, his general cognitive limitations and severely limited reading abilities rendered him unable to read and understand the election form without assistance” and that prison officials failed to provide a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the entry of a preliminary injunction, prohibiting Reeves’s execution other than by nitrogen hypoxia while his ADA claim remains pending. Reeves has standing, having demonstrated an injury in fact by alleging that lethal injection is significantly more painful than nitrogen hypoxia. Reeves showed that he was substantially likely to succeed on the merits by proving that he is a qualified individual with a disability; he lacked meaningful access to the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities by reason of his disability; and the public entity failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. Reeves could only comprehend at a first-grade level. The election form required an eleventh-grade reading level to be understood. View "Reeves v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Taxpayer conceded that he failed to report his foreign bank accounts to the IRS, but contested the IRS's determination that his violations were willful and argued for vacatur of his civil penalties. The district court held that taxpayer's violations were reckless, and therefore willful, in most of the tax years at issue. The district court also held that the IRS had miscalculated taxpayer's civil penalties and set them aside under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and then sua sponte calculated and imposed a fresh set of penalties.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court applied the correct legal standard in analyzing whether taxpayer willfully violated the FBAR reporting requirements. The court explained that willful conduct in the FBAR context includes knowing and reckless conduct. Reckless conduct is action that objectively entails a high risk of harm, which is the standard the district court applied. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the civil penalties assessed by the IRS were unlawful under the APA and must be recalculated. In this case, the IRS erred by using the wrong foreign bank account balances to calculate taxpayer's penalties, contravening the relevant statute and regulations. The district court further erred by calculating and imposing new penalties instead of remanding to the agency, as required by the APA. The court explained that, even though the district court ultimately arrived at the same total penalty amount the IRS did originally, the IRS's original errors were not harmless. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for recalculation. View "United States v. Schwarzbaum" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Maldonado and Hill filed suit in Florida state court, asserting violations of their federal and state constitutional rights to the free exercise of their religion. After plaintiffs were granted in forma pauperis status by the state court, the case was removed to federal court where plaintiffs did not seek in forma pauperis status. The district court dismissed Maldonado's claims under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g)—the three-strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)—and dismissed Hill's claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.In regard to Maldonado, the Eleventh Circuit held that a case commenced in state court by a prisoner and removed by a defendant to federal court—with the defendant paying the filing fee after removal—is not subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). In regard to Hill, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing his claims for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. View "Maldonado v. Baker County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision affirming the bankruptcy court's order granting the Bank's objection to plaintiff's claimed bankruptcy estate exemptions. The court concluded that Roth IRAs are excluded from Georgia debtors' bankruptcy estates pursuant to federal law. The court found that the development of the caselaw in this area and the subsequent amendments to the Georgia Code reflect the Georgia Assembly's intention to clarify that both traditional IRAs as defined in 26 U.S.C. 408 and Roth IRAs as defined in section 408A are exempt from garnishment, thus subjecting IRAs to a restriction on transfer by state statute, and making both types of IRAs eligible for exclusion under the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the court remanded so that the district court may reverse the order of the bankruptcy court. View "Hoffman v. Signature Bank of Georgia" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for federal child sex crimes. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his long-term sexual abuse of two young girls. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant; the FBI's negligence does not justify excluding the New York or Kentucky evidence; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial. View "United States v. Nicholson" on Justia Law

Vital produces and sells energy-drink products. In 2019, Vital hired Alfieri, Perry, LaRocca, and Maros. All four signed employment agreements containing restrictive covenants, including an agreement not to work for a competing company and not to solicit Vital employees while employed by and for one year after leaving Vital and “never to disclose” or utilize any of Vital’s confidential information. All four left Vital in 2020. Vital sued, alleging that they violated their non-compete covenants by working for Elegance, which sells a cannabidiol-infused caffeinated drink, within a year after leaving Vital; that Alfieri violated the employee non-solicitation covenant by encouraging the others to join Elegance; and that Elegance and Alfieri engaged in tortious interference with Vital’s contractual relationships with the other former employees.The district court determined that the restrictive covenants were enforceable under Florida law, rejecting an argument that Vital was required to “identify specific customers” to establish a legitimate business interest in its customer relationships. The court entered a preliminary injunction. The two time-limited provisions in the preliminary injunction had expired; the prohibition against using Vital’s confidential information had no time limit. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed as moot the portions of the appeal that concerned the expired provisions. The court vacated with respect to the unexpired provisions because Vital failed to prove its entitlement to preliminary relief. View "Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Alfieri" on Justia Law

In October 2018, Butts County Sheriff’s Office deputies placed signs in the front yards of the residences of all 57 registered sex offenders within the County, warning “STOP” and “NO TRICK-OR-TREAT AT THIS ADDRESS.” The Sheriff also posted an explanation of the signs on Facebook, in order to associate the signs with the registrants who lived on the properties. Before Halloween 2019, three registered sex offenders living in Butts County sued, seeking to enjoin the Sheriff from placing the signs again. Contrary to the Sheriff’s initial assertions, Georgia law does not forbid registered sex offenders from participating in Halloween. The district court rejected the suit on summary judgment.The Eleventh Circuit vacated. The Sheriff’s warning signs are compelled government speech, and their placement violates a homeowner’s First Amendment rights. The forced display of a government message on private property violates the “right to refrain from speaking at all,” and the signs are not a narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling government interest. The Sheriff’s interest in protecting children from sexual abuse is compelling but the Sheriff has not provided any evidence that the registrants actually pose a danger to trick-or-treating children or that these signs would serve to prevent such danger. View "McClendon v. Long" on Justia Law

Fees are collected under 28 U.S.C. 1930 in each quarter of a chapter 11 bankruptcy based on the amount of disbursements made. The U.S. Trustee collects the fees in most districts in the country, while an arm of the Judicial Conference does so in six. In 2017, 28 U.S.C. 1930(a)(6) increased the quarterly fee chargeable for the largest chapter 11 bankruptcies, those distributing $1 million or more in a given quarter.The bankruptcy court concluded that the increase applied to disbursements in a case pending at the time the law was enacted. The Eleventh Circuit agreed that the 2017 legislation applied to pending bankruptcy cases without a due process violation and without offending the Bankruptcy Uniformity Clause. Congress expressly prescribed the temporal reach of the 2017 Amendment and included disbursements in pending cases. The quarterly fees are assessed against the users of the chapter 11 bankruptcy trustee systems to reimburse the government for its costs; the fees are not subject to the constitutional uniformity requirement applicable to taxes. The 2017 Amendment is uniform in the sense contemplated by the Bankruptcy Clause. View "United States Trustee Region 21 v. Bast Amron LLP" on Justia Law

In 2007, Moore was convicted of possession of several unregistered destructive devices and was sentenced to the statutory maximum for his offense—120 months’ imprisonment, followed by 36 months’ supervised release. He completed his term of imprisonment in 2016. His supervised release has been revoked three times. Upon the third revocation, Moore was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment and an additional 18 months’ supervised release. During the revocation proceedings, he was also sentenced to a consecutive term of six months’ imprisonment for criminal contempt. Moore argued that 18 U.S.C. 3583(e), the statute under which he was sentenced upon revocation, was unconstitutional because it allowed the district court to extend Moore’s sentence beyond the authorized statutory maximum for his offense of conviction based solely on “judge-found facts” in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. Although the district court plainly erred in imposing an additional term of supervised release because it failed to account for the terms of imprisonment that were imposed upon the prior revocations of his supervised release, section 3583(e) is not unconstitutional as applied to Moore; the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence. The district court did not plainly err in convicting Moore of criminal contempt without giving him an opportunity to allocute. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law