Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Debtor executed a security deed for a piece of property. She acknowledged the deed to her closing attorney who certified the acknowledgment on the deed’s final page.Under Georgia law, a deed must be attested by two witnesses, and at least one of them needs to be an official such as a notary or court clerk. Here, the deed was invalid because the attorney was a notary, but he failed to attest to the deed. The error was discovered a few years later when the debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Under federal law, a bankruptcy trustee may void a deed if it is voidable by a bona fide purchaser. The managing trustee noticed the problem and sued the loan companies to keep the property in the bankruptcy estate. The loan companies argue that they have produced what the statute requires to save a problematic deed: an affidavit from a “subscribing witness.” Here, the court reasoned that a person becomes a subscribing witness only when she attests a deed, and the closing attorney did not do so. Therefore, the loan companies’ interest in the real property is voidable. View "Pingora Loan Servicing, LLC, et al. v. Cathy L. Scarver" on Justia Law

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) sued Ocwen Financial Corporation (“Ocwen”) and several of its affiliates claiming some of the company's mortgage-servicing practices violated federal law. The CFPB’s suit was resolved by a settlement agreement that was memorialized in a formal consent judgment. The CFPB sued Ocwen a second time, alleging various consumer-protection law violations occurring between January 2014 and February 2017. The district court granted summary judgment to Ocwen on res judicata grounds, reasoning that the 2013 action barred the lawsuit.The CFPB contends that the 2013 action’s res judicata effect should be controlled by that case’s consent judgment, not its complaint and that the underlying settlement agreement shows that the parties didn’t intend to preclude a challenge to any conduct occurring from 2014 onwards. The court reasoned that determining the preclusive effect of a consent judgment requires applying contract law principles. The court found that the res judicata effects of an earlier lawsuit resolved by a consent judgment are measured by reference to the terms of the consent judgment, rather than the complaint. Thus, CFPB may sue Ocwen for alleged violations that occurred between January 2014 and February 2017, if the claims are not covered by the consent judgment’s servicing standard, monitoring, and enforcement regime. View "Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Ocwen Financial Corporation, et al." on Justia Law

In March 2017, a woman contacted police explaining that the defendant, her ex-boyfriend, was having sex with her 14-year-old sister. When the girl’s family confronted her, she acknowledged that she was communicating with the defendant over social media, had sent him nude pictures, and that they had sex. The defendant’s cell phone contained nude pictures of the girl. The defendant was charged with various sex offenses in a seven-count indictment. During his arrest, officers confiscated the defendant's second cell phone, which contained additional inculpatory evidence.The district court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in his home during a warrantless search, from one of his cellphones obtained from his work, and his statements to detectives. The defendant was ultimately convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment plus a consecutive ten-year mandatory minimum sentence.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The officers had consent to enter the defendant’s home to obtain his cell phone. Once officers reviewed the phone, they then developed probable cause to search the defendant’s second cell phone. The court also rejected the defendant’s challenges to the computation of his sentence. View "USA v. Romeo Valentin Sanchez" on Justia Law

While driving the co-plaintiffs car, the plaintiff negligently changed lanes and caused a collision, seriously injuring another driver. At the time of the incident at-fault car’s owner had a GEICO insurance policy that provided bodily-injury coverage up to $100,000 per person. The victim and Geico assert they made offers to settle, but the parties never agreed. After the conclusion of the victim's lawsuit, plaintiffs sued GEICO for bad faith, seeking to recover the amounts of the final judgments entered against them that exceeded the $100,000 policy limit. They contended that GEICO had breached its fiduciary duty to them by failing to settle the victim’s case within the policy limit. Plaintiffs challenge Cawthorn v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co 791 F. App’x 60, 65 (11th Cir. 2019), arguing that Florida law doesn’t require that a verdict precede an excess judgment as a prerequisite to proving the causation element of an insurer-bad-faith claim. The court reasoned that plaintiffs' available coverage and final judgments entered against them constituted excess judgments. Thus, plaintiffs could prove causation in their bad-faith case because they were subject to excess judgments. Finally, the court declined to follow Cawthorn because that court incorrectly analyzed Florida's bad-faith law and is unpersuasive. View "Erika L. McNamara v. Government Employees Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Under its Social Media Policy, Defendants, the Palm Beach County Fire Rescue Department, disciplined appellants, two firefighters who work for the department. The termination resulted from an exchange the appellants had on an invitation-only social medial page associated with one of Appellant’s campaigns for the presidency of the local firefighters’ union. Appellants accused Defendants of conspiring to misuse member-donated paid time off. The court reviewed the case by examining four factors developed from Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Connick v. Myer, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). The court held that the district court (“DC”) erred in finding that Appellants’ speech did not address a matter of public concern at step one of the four-part test.Further, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the DC’s dismissal of Appellants’ free-association claim, finding that it is a free speech claim at its core. Finally, the court found that the Social Media Policy in question suffers from “astonishing breadth,” as it expressly prohibits “disseminating content” that “could be reasonably interpreted as having an adverse effect upon Fire Rescue morale, discipline, operations, the safety of staff, or perception of the public.” The court vacated the DC’s summary judgment on the overbreadth claim and affirmed the DC’s decision rejecting Appellants’ facial-vagueness claim. View "AJ O'Laughlin, et al. v. Palm Beach County" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs are “business development managers” tasked with persuading corporate customers to purchase vehicles for their fleets. The task often requires over 40 hours of effort per week, and the plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to overtime compensation. The defendants argue that the plaintiffs are covered by the administrative exemption in the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).Under the FLSA, employees who work over 40 hours per week are generally entitled to time-and-a-half overtime compensation. However, not all workers qualify, as the statute exempts employees working in “a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity.” The plaintiffs contend that they do not meet the third prong of the exemption, which requires that they exercise discretion and independent judgment concerning matters of significance. The court reasoned that a worker need not have “limitless discretion” or a total lack of supervision to qualify as an administrative employee. Further, the defendant pointed to ample evidence that the plaintiffs exercised discretion in their job pursuits. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment finding that the administrative exemption in the FLSA applies to the plaintiffs. View "Alicia Brown v. Nexus Business Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

Relators brought qui tam claims against dozens of defendants alleging healthcare fraud against the federal government in April 2017. H.I.G. Capital, LLC and H.I.G. Surgery Centers, LLC (“H.I.G.”) were among the defendants. Plaintiffs amended their complaint in January 2019.Previously, another group of relators filed qui tam claims against several of the same defendants; however, they did not name H.I.G. in their initial complaint. The federal government intervened, resulting in a $41 million settlement which included the defendants and both sets of relators. The settlement agreement released H.I.G. insofar as any independent conduct outside their status as investors in or owners of the defendants included in the settlement. Relators then amended their complaint a second time, narrowing their allegations to focus only on H.I.G.The district court granted H.I.G.’s motion to dismiss based on the first-to-file rule. The district court determined that, because the settled claim was pending at the time Relators filed their initial complaint, Relators’ complaint was barred if the actions were related. The district court found the cases were related and dismissed Relators’ claims.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Relators filed their complaints while the action that was eventually settled was pending. Thus, Relators’ case must be dismissed if the actions were related. The court then adopted the “same material elements” test relied upon by other circuit courts. Finding that the two cases contained the same material elements of fraud, the court concluded the district court properly dismissed Relators’ claims. View "Sheldon Cho, et al v. H.I.G. Capital, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, concluding that defendant has forfeited any argument under which the court may grant relief. In this case, defendant alleged that the district court improperly denied his right to self-representation under Faretta v. California. The court concluded that, despite the existence of a circuit split on whether a voluntary guilty plea waives the right to self-representation on appeal and the court's own order to defendant's appellate counsel instructing her to brief whether this court can review a denial of the right to self-representation following a guilty plea, appellate counsel failed to make any argument in the opening brief that even approached the applicable legal question. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit dismissed based on lack of jurisdiction A.B.'s appeal of a declaratory judgment that an insurer has no duty to defend the insured man that sexually abused her. The court explained that the declaratory judgment relieved the insurance company of any obligation to defend the insured which helps, rather than harms, A.B. Furthermore, if A.B. cannot obtain review of the declaratory judgment, it lacks preclusive effect on her. Therefore, A.B. lacks appellate standing as she suffered no injury from the judgment in favor of the insurance company. View "Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. A.B." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Americans with Disabilities lawsuit based on lack of Article III standing, concluding that plaintiff has at least alleged an Article III qualifying stigmatic injury. In this case, plaintiff alleged that she suffered a concrete injury when she viewed a hotel's website that omitted accessibility-related information required by federal regulations and as a result, she says, experienced "frustration and humiliation"—even though she admits that she had (and has) no intention to personally visit the hotel.Despite the absence of a close common-law comparator, the court concluded that under existing precedent plaintiff has alleged a concrete intangible injury. The court explained that plaintiff's allegations satisfy Article III under a narrower reading of Sierra v. City of Hallandale Beach, 996 F.3d 1110 (11th Cir. 2021). Because she claims not only that she suffered illegal discrimination but also that the discrimination resulted in "frustration and humiliation" and a "sense of isolation and segregation," the court concluded that plaintiff has adequately pleaded a concrete stigmatic injury. And because her emotional injury is her emotional injury, it affects her "in a personal and individual way" and is therefore sufficiently particularized. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Laufer v. Arpan LLC" on Justia Law