Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Speech First, Inc. (“Speech First”) filed a lawsuit against the University of Central Florida (“University”) arguing that Defendant’s discriminatory-harassment and bias-related-incidents policies violate the First Amendment. Specifically, Speech First contended that the policies are unconstitutionally overbroad and the discriminatory-harassment policy restricts speech based on viewpoint and content. The district court held that Speech First lacked Article III standing to challenge the policies.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part, holding that Speech First has standing to sue and the discriminatory-harassment policy likely violates the First Amendment on the grounds that it is an overbroad and content- and viewpoint-based regulation of constitutionally protected expression. The court explained that Speech First has standing to challenge both policies at issue because the policies objectively chill its members’ speech. Further, the court found that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to preliminarily enjoin the discriminatory-harassment policy and that the district court should determine in the first instance whether Speech First is entitled to a preliminary injunction of the bias-related-incidents policy. View "Speech First, Inc. v. Alexander Cartwright" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g) and 924(a)(2). He argued that the district court did not elicit objections as required by United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1990).   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The court explained that under Jones, a district court must fully articulate objections to the court’s ultimate findings and conclusions of law following the imposition of a sentence. Here, the court found that the district court did not follow the procedures set forth in Jones. It explained that during the sentencing hearing, no one addressed the firearm being stolen from a police department. Rather, when read together, the allegations explained that the gun in question was reported stolen in the sheriff’s office county, not that it was stolen from the sheriff. Because the district court first announced this conclusion after the sentencing hearing when it issued the written document, the district court did not provide Defendant an opportunity to object to its finding as to the victim of the theft.   The court noted that in most cases a discrepancy between a court’s real-time pronouncement and later-filed form would not support a Jones claim. However, here, the district court failed to fully state its basis for departing during the sentencing hearing. Thus, in this situation, the post-sentencing form exposed an error. View "USA v. Karijmah Tremaine Mosely" on Justia Law

While investigating a suspected drug trafficking conspiracy, a Georgia Bureau of Investigation agent secured a wiretap authorization order from a state judge. The wiretap ultimately implicated nine people in the conspiracy. When federal authorities prosecuted them based on this state-gathered evidence, the defendants asked the district court to suppress it. The district court denied their motions, the defendants pleaded guilty to federal drug crimes, and each defendant expressly reserved his suppression arguments for appeal.The defendants argue that the recordings were never properly sealed both because the judge did not issue a separate, written sealing order after receiving the recordings and because the government “maintained access” to the original recordings after sealing. The court found that the state judge properly sealed the wiretap recordings, reasoning that the recordings were “made available to the [authorizing] judge” and “sealed under his directions.” No one accessed them after they were physically sealed.Further, Section 2518(8)(a) requires that the recordings be sealed “[i]mmediately upon the expiration of the period of the order or extensions thereof.” The statute states that a delay in sealing should be excused if the government provides a “satisfactory explanation” for the delay. Considering the absence of tampering, the government’s good faith, the short delay, the lack of tactical advantage to the government or prejudice to the defendants, and the objective reasonableness of the agents’ actions, the court found that the government provided a satisfactory explanation for any delay in sealing. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling. View "USA v. Mario Demitric Stowers" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute and use a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime. The district court sentenced him to a term of 210 months of imprisonment on the narcotics offense and a consecutive term of 84 months of imprisonment on the firearm offense. Defendant wrote a letter to the district court asking whether he was eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act and requesting the appointment of counsel to file a motion under the Act. Defendant appealed the district court's adverse decision.The court found that Defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. The court reasoned that under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, made retroactive by the First Step Act, a narcotics offense involving less than 28 grams of crack cocaine now carries a statutory penalty of up to 20 years with no mandatory minimum. Thus, because Defendant’s statutory penalty for his crack cocaine offense has been modified by the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act, his conviction is a “covered offense” under Sec. 404(a) of the First Step Act. The court further found that the district court erred when it issued its alternative ruling that Defendant did not merit a reduction of his sentence it did so without hearing from him. Thus, the court reversed the district court’s order denying the construed motion and remanded. View "USA v. Tydearain Smith" on Justia Law

Gulfstream, a Georgia corporation, and Oceltip, an Australian company, entered a sales agreement (“Agreement”). Gulfstream terminated the Agreement after Oceltip failed to pay the full amount or cure a defect within the ten-day cure period.Oceltip submitted a demand for arbitration to the AAA, seeking a finding that Gulfstream had anticipatorily repudiated the Agreement and that this conduct suspended Oceltip’s duties, allowing Oceltip to recoup the money it had paid, and entitled Oceltip to damages. On appeal, Oceltip asserts that federal jurisdiction is lacking. It also argues that the district court erred in confirming the arbitration award and denying vacatur because, in Oceltip’s view, the Georgia Arbitration Code’s standards for vacatur—not the FAA’s—govern, and the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law.First, the court found it has jurisdiction under Sec 203 of the FAA. Next, in resolving the disagreement the court analyzed whether arbitrators’ “manifest disregard of the law” supplies a basis for vacating the award. Under the Georgia Arbitration Code, it does, but federal law—the New York Convention and its implementing statute (Chapter 2 of the FAA)—sets forth seven exclusive grounds for vacatur, which does not include “manifest disregard of the law.” The court concluded that the Agreement’s choice-of-law provision does not supplant federal standards for confirmation or vacatur of an arbitral award, reasoning that the plain meaning of the contractual language does not support Oceltip’s position. Thus, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation v. Oceltip Aviation 1 PTY LTD" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are property owners in Forsyth County who used to rent their homes on a short-term basis. Forsyth County recently amended its Unified Development Code (“UDC”) to prohibit certain property owners from renting their homes on a short-term basis. The amendment includes a grandfathering provision under which a property owner who was engaged in previously lawful activity that is now prohibited may continue to engage in that use. Plaintiffs sought the ability to continue renting their homes on a short-term basis under the amended UDC. The dispute involves determining which of the terms, “owner occupancy,” “rental,” and/or “lease” the phrase “on a weekly, monthly or longer basis” modifies. The court determined that neither the last-antecedent rule nor the series-qualifier canon rule would shed light on the UDC’s meaning. Therefore, the court found that it must discern and apply the ordinary meaning of the terms at issue. Applying ordinary meanings, the court concluded that the prior version of the UDC prohibited short-term rentals.Further, the court disagreed with Plaintiffs’ argument that “[b]ecause the prohibition on ‘rentals’ of less than a week was not explicit in the ordinances, the former UDC[‘s short-term rental ban] was void for vagueness.” The court reasoned that “when the plain text of the statute sets forth clearly perceived boundaries, our inquiry is ended.” Here, the court found that the plain text of the ordinance prohibited short-term rentals, thereby ending the court’s vagueness inquiry. Thus, short-term rentals remain prohibited. View "Kenneth R. Heyman, et al v. Molly Cooper, et al" on Justia Law

Previously, a panel of 11th Circuit judges affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's 42 Sec. 1983 claims under the three-strikes rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). The panel based its decision on precedent holding that a "dismissal for failure to exhaust qualifies as a strike under the PLRA."The court voted, deciding to hear the appeal en banc. Thus, the panel's decision was vacated. View "Jeremy John Wells v. Warden, et al." on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of three misdemeanor counts of willful failure to file a federal income tax return. Defendant was represented by counsel at trial, but he lacked representation during the pretrial process. At his arraignment, Defendant expressed his desire to waive his right to counsel and to represent himself. The magistrate judge found that Defendant’s waiver was knowing, even after misinforming him that the maximum sentence he could receive if convicted was 12 months of imprisonmentThe court found the magistrate judge’s statements were materially incorrect. Instead of “unambiguously” informing Defendant of the penalties he faced, the magistrate judge incorrectly asserted that “we’re not talking about a felony involving imprisonment beyond one year”—when the true maximum sentence was three times longer. Thus, the court held that there was no knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. Next, the court found that the deprivation of Defendant’s right to counsel at all pretrial stages of the proceedings against him was a structural error. As such, the court vacated Defendant’s conviction and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "USA v. Saleem Hakim" on Justia Law

Several young girls were locked out of their social media accounts. Shortly after being locked out, Defendant would contact them, demanding pornographic images. Defendant threatened to release the images to the girls' social media followers if they did not follow his instructions. One of the girls called the police, which eventually led them to Defendant's residence. The officer told Defendant he was not under arrest but that he was investigating a crime. Defendant admitted to taking over about 20 girls' social media accounts and provided details about the involvement of several other men. The district denied Defendant's motion to suppress the statements he made to police. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment followed by a life term of supervised release.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding Defendant was not under arrest at the time he made the statements to the police. The court also affirmed Defendant's sentence, finding it was not procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "USA v. Joseph Isaiah Woodson, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant owns an automobile dealership that operates a service department. When a customer brings a car to Defendant for service, he allows the customer to use a dealership-owned vehicle while the customer’s car is being serviced.The current case arose following an incident when Defendant’s customer was using a loaner vehicle while Defendant was servicing his vehicle. The customer caused an accident with Plaintiff who brought a lawsuit against Defendant for vicarious liability under Florida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine.On appeal, the court reviewed (1) whether Defendant rented or leased the vehicle and (2) whether summary judgment was improper because Defendant used conflicting labels for the vehicle. The relevant portion of the Graves Amendment provides that, generally, a motor vehicle owner who rents or leases the vehicle to a person shall not be liable under the law for harm that results from the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the rental period, if the owner is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner.The court held that Defendant rented or leased the vehicle to the driver and thus enjoys the protection of the Graves Amendment. The extent a rent or lease requires agreed-upon consideration, this exchange had that. Further, the substance of the transaction, not the label used, controls. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant. View "Cindy Thayer v. Randy Marion Chevrolet Buick Cadillac, LLC" on Justia Law