Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Moore was convicted of possession of several unregistered destructive devices and was sentenced to the statutory maximum for his offense—120 months’ imprisonment, followed by 36 months’ supervised release. He completed his term of imprisonment in 2016. His supervised release has been revoked three times. Upon the third revocation, Moore was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment and an additional 18 months’ supervised release. During the revocation proceedings, he was also sentenced to a consecutive term of six months’ imprisonment for criminal contempt. Moore argued that 18 U.S.C. 3583(e), the statute under which he was sentenced upon revocation, was unconstitutional because it allowed the district court to extend Moore’s sentence beyond the authorized statutory maximum for his offense of conviction based solely on “judge-found facts” in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. Although the district court plainly erred in imposing an additional term of supervised release because it failed to account for the terms of imprisonment that were imposed upon the prior revocations of his supervised release, section 3583(e) is not unconstitutional as applied to Moore; the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence. The district court did not plainly err in convicting Moore of criminal contempt without giving him an opportunity to allocute. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

Norton operated a pressure washer on a Tampa Convention Center dock that had no guardrails or barricades and was surrounded on three sides by water. Norton fell into the bay while working and drowned. He was wearing rubber boots and was not wearing a personal flotation device. During an investigation, an OSHA officer did not identify any incidents of employees falling off the dock before Norton’s accident, but did learn that two employees who had pressure washed the same dock voluntarily wore personal flotation devices. OSHA issued a citation to C&W for its failure to provide and require the use of a personal flotation device and proposed a $12,675 penalty.Eleventh Circuit precedents required proof either that the use of personal flotation devices was an industry custom or that C&W had “clear actual knowledge that personal protective equipment was necessary under the circumstances.” OSHA did not present any evidence of industry custom. An ALJ concluded that C&W had “clear actual knowledge" that personal protective equipment was necessary, given “an open and obvious hazard.” The Eleventh Circuit vacated the citation. The Commission misapplied the standard for actual knowledge in the absence of industry custom. A finding that C&W had actual knowledge of the requirement to provide and require the use of personal flotation devices for employees when they pressure washed the dock was not supported by substantial evidence. View "C&W Facility Services, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment in part in favor of defendants and holding that James River has a duty to defend the insureds: Ultratec, MST, and Ultratec's employee. The underlying action stemmed from a pyrotechnic explosion at a work place that killed two employees and injured others. The employees filed suit against Ultratec, Ultratec's employee, and MST. James River is Ultratec entities' insurer.The court concluded that it has jurisdiction over the appeal despite its lack of finality because of its injunctive qualities. The court applied Alabama's contract interpretation principles and case law before applying that law to the insurance policy at issue, holding that James River has a duty to defend defendants because the employer's liability exclusion in the policy is ambiguous. The court explained that, because the exclusion did not unambiguously exclude coverage, James River had a duty to defend the insureds. View "James River Insurance Co. v. Ultratec Special Effects Inc." on Justia Law

Smith, a software engineer, obtained the coordinates of artificial fishing reefs in the Gulf of Mexico from a website owned by StrikeLines, a Florida business. Smith remained in Mobile, Alabama while posting information about the reef coordinates on Facebook. Smith initially agreed to remove the posts and to assist Strikelines with its security issues in exchange for additional coordinates but communications broke down. StrikeLines contacted law enforcement. Officers executed a search warrant and found StrikeLines’s coordinates and other customer and sales data on Smith’s devices. Smith was charged in the Northern District of Florida with violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2)(C), (c)(2)(B)(iii), theft of trade secrets, and transmitting a threat through interstate commerce with intent to extort. Smith argued that venue was improper because all the prohibited conduct occurred in the Alabama and the data that was accessed and obtained was in the Middle District of Florida.Smith was convicted on the trade secrets and extortion counts in the Northern District of Florida. The Eleventh Circuit vacated Smith’s trade secrets conviction and related sentencing enhancements for lack of venue, affirmed the extortion conviction and related sentencing enhancements, and remanded. Smith never committed any essential conduct for the trade secrets conviction in the Northern District of Florida. Sufficient evidence supported the extortion conviction. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Mutual sold fractional investment interests in viatical settlements in which a terminally ill insured sold his life insurance policy to a third party for a lump-sum cash payment--a percentage of the policy’s face value. In 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission sued Mutual for falsely representing that its life expectancy figures, “of paramount importance” for valuing the settlements, had been produced by independent physicians. The Mutual policies were put into receivership; investors were given the option of retaining their investments or directing the receiver to sell. Some of the "Keep" investors did not pay their share of premiums, leaving the policies at risk of lapse and the non-defaulting investors at risk of losing their investments. Acheron purchased fractional interests of defaulting investors from the receiver.In 2009, the district court approved the transfer and management of the Keep Policies—including some policies in which Acheron held fractional interests—from the receiver to a trustee. The trustee obtained court approval to sell the policies in the trust, including those in which Acheron held an interest. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Acheron’s appeal, finding that it lacked jurisdiction. The order is not a final decision, 28 U.S.C. 1291, and did not involve the refusal to wind up a receivership, section 1292(a)(2). View "Acheron Capital, Ltd. v. Mukamal" on Justia Law

Mutua, a citizen of Kenya, was admitted into the U.S. as a non-immigrant temporary visitor for business. He did not depart as his visa required but married a U.S. citizen. Several years later, Mutua applied for adjustment of status. DHS denied Mutua’s application because he had criminal charges pending, arising from an alleged sexual assault of a child (his niece). Matua's trial resulted in a hung jury. The state dismissed the charge because the victim did not want another trial. Mutua was charged as removable, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B). The IJ recognized that Mutua was statutorily eligible for adjustment of status but denied his application because Mutua did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion. The BIA affirmed, rejecting an argument that the IJ required Mutua to prove his lack of criminal activity by a “clear and convincing” standard. The BIA declined to take administrative notice of Mutua’s criminal trial transcript.The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting arguments that the IJ held Mutua to an improperly high burden of proof when considering whether he was entitled to a favorable exercise of discretion, that the BIA applied the wrong standard of review to the IJ’s determination and misinterpreted its own regulations on administrative notice, and that the BIA should have referred his appeal to a three-member panel because his case involved complex, novel, or unusual issues of law. View "Mutua v. United States Attorney General" on Justia Law

In the early 1900s, New York City used a Brooklyn powerhouse to provide electricity for its trolley system. In 1940, the City took ownership of the power plant and removed a smokestack, placed it in the building's basement, on top of a mechanical system that was insulated with friable asbestos-containing material, and buried it under a concrete slab. Enterprises acquired the property in 1986. An asbestos inspection by the city revealed that the property was contaminated with PCBs. The property was placed on New York’s Registry of Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, rendering it effectively worthless. The state began remediation in 2015. The discovery of the buried smokestack and friable asbestos-containing material postponed the project indefinitely. New York City continued to tax the property according to its “best intended use” as a warehouse. Rather than paying the taxes or properly challenging their validity, Enterprises ignored them. The taxes became liens.In 2018, Enterprises filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and initiated an adversary proceeding against the city, alleging “continuous trespass,” and seeking a declaratory judgment that the city is responsible for the hazardous waste and resulting damage and improperly taxed the property. The bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary proceeding. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Even assuming the latest possible date of discovery, Enterprises’ trespass claim is time-barred. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C. 505(a)(2)(C), prohibited the court from redetermining the tax assessments. View "5200 Enterprises Ltd. v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Georgia law places restrictions on which prospective candidates for elective office can appear on the general election ballot. The Libertarian Party of Georgia, prospective Libertarian candidates, and affiliated voters ask the court to hold that Georgia's ballot-access laws unconstitutionally burden their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and deny them equal protection.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court incorrectly held that the laws violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court explained that, under the Anderson framework, the laws need only be justified by the State's important regulatory interests. In this case, the interests the Secretary asserts—in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization's candidate on the ballot, in maintaining the orderly administration of elections, and in avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the general election—are compelling. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that Georgia's laws do not cause an equal protection violation. The court concluded that the Secretary's stated interest sufficiently justifies the distinction between candidates. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, vacated the district court's injunction, and remanded. View "Cowen v. Secretary of State of the State of Georgia" on Justia Law

Booker is on Florida’s death row for first-degree murder. In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. In 2020, the Capital Habeas Unit of the Office of the Federal Public Defender (CHU) sought permission to represent Booker in state court to exhaust a “Brady” claim so that Booker could pursue the claim in a successive federal habeas petition. The Brady claim focused on the prosecution’s failure to disclose notes that allegedly could have been used to impeach an FBI hair expert. Booker said that he had learned through a FOIA request and a review by a qualified microscopist that there were inconsistencies between the expert’s trial testimony and his notes. The state objected to the appointment of CHU, noting that Booker had a state-law right to counsel through Florida’s Capital Collateral Regional Counsel North (CCRC-N); CCRC-N counsel was appointed to represent Booker in state court. Nonetheless, the district court appointed CHU under 18 U.S.C. 3599 to represent Booker in state courtThe Eleventh Circuit dismissed an appeal. Florida cannot establish standing based on a hypothetical conflict of interest that is not actual or imminent. State courts are empowered to reject appearances by CHU counsel, so the appointment cannot have inflicted an injury on Florida’s sovereignty. View "Booker v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Because the Eleventh Circuit previously determined that the Government does not have to formally intervene before filing a motion to settle a qui tam action, and because the reasoning is the same for dismissals, the court held that the Government does not have to formally intervene before moving to dismiss a qui tam case even though it had earlier declined to intervene. The court also concluded that decisions to dismiss are within the province of the Executive Branch subject only to limits imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a statute, or the Constitution.The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case. Here, when relators filed their initial complaint, the United States declined to intervene. Relators then filed an amended complaint adding additional defendants, some of which were Government employees in their individual and official capacities. The United States subsequently filed a motion to dismiss without first filing a motion to intervene in the case. View "United States v. McAvoy" on Justia Law