Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the tax court's order disallowing taxpayers' carryover deduction for the donation of a conservation easement. The court concluded that the Commissioner's interpretation of I.R.C. 1.170A14(g)(6)(ii) is arbitrary and capricious and violates the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) procedural requirements. The court explained that Treasury, in promulgating the extinguishment proceeds regulation, failed to respond to NYLC's significant comment concerning the post-donation improvements issue as to proceeds. Because the court found the Commissioner's interpretation of section 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) invalid under the APA, it concluded that the easement deed's subtraction of the value of post-donation improvements from the extinguishment proceeds allocated to the donee does not violate section 170(h)(5)'s protected-in-perpetuity requirement. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Hewitt v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

In this qui tam action, after the jury found that Pinellas violated the False Claims Act and that the United States sustained damages, the district court trebled the damages and imposed statutory minimum penalties of $1,177,000 ($5,500 for each of the 214 violations).The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court upheld the district court's admission of Exhibit 24 where Pinellas failed to argue that the admission of the evidence constituted plain error. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have found that, had Medicare known of Pinellas's misrepresentations, it would not have paid the refiled reimbursement claims. Furthermore, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence on scienter is not overwhelmingly in favor of Pinellas. Therefore, the jury's decision stands. The court also upheld the jury's findings on damages where the court concluded that the proper measure of damages in this case is the difference between what the United States paid and what it would have paid had Pinellas' claims been truthful. The court rejected the remaining challenges to the jury's verdict. The court further concluded that the monetary award imposed does not violate the Excessive Fines Clause. Finally, the court dismissed Pinellas' appeal as to the allocation of the monetary award between Ms. Yates and the United States. View "Yates v. Pinellas Hematology & Oncology, P.A." on Justia Law

After Allstate decided to stop paying premiums on retired employees' life insurance policies, two putative classes filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Turner retirees are made up of retired former Allstate employees to whom Allstate no longer provides life insurance. The Klaas retirees consist of individuals who took part in a special retirement opportunity with Allstate.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Allstate, concluding that Allstate had the authority under the summary plan descriptions to terminate the retiree life insurance benefits for both putative classes and did not violate Section 502(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The court also concluded that any claims for breach of fiduciary duty brought under section 502(a)(3) were time barred. View "Klaas v. Allstate Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated defendant's 110-month sentence for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The court held that the government did not waive its argument that defendant's conviction qualified as a predicate crime of violence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), where, as here, the argument was foreclosed by binding precedent at the time of sentencing and the change in law occurred within the time to file a notice of appeal. Therefore, the court need not determine whether a conviction for robbery under Georgia law is an ACCA predicate offense. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Sharp" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, four sex trafficking victims, filed suit against numerous defendants within the hotel industry for violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), specifically 18 U.S.C. 1595(a), and Georgia state law. The district court held that plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege claims against three hotel franchisors: Choice Hotels, Wyndham Hotels, and Microtel Inn & Suites.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that Section 1595(a) should be applied according to its plain meaning: that is, to state a claim for beneficiary liability under the TVPRA, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendant (1) knowingly benefited (2) from taking part in a common undertaking or enterprise involving risk and potential profit, (3) that the undertaking or enterprise violated the TVPRA as to the plaintiff, and (4) that the defendant had constructive or actual knowledge that the undertaking or enterprise violated the TVPRA as to the plaintiff. The court concluded that plaintiffs have failed to meet that burden as to the three franchisors at issue on appeal. The court likewise concluded that, as to these three defendants, plaintiffs did not state a plausible claim under Georgia state law. View "Doe v. Choice Hotels International, Inc." on Justia Law

Fintech, a seller of software that processes alcohol-sales invoices within 24 hours, filed suit against its competitor, iControl, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets. After the jury found in favor of Fintech, iControl sought a new trial on liability and judgment as a matter of law on damages. Fintech then sought a permanent injunction broadly prohibiting iControl from using either company's software. The district court denied all motions and both parties appealed.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court correctly denied iControl's new trial motion on liability where there is no "absolute absence of evidence" to set aside the jury's findings; erred in denying iControl's judgment as a matter of law motion on damages because Fintech did not deduct marginal costs in calculating lost profits; and correctly refused Fintech's requested injunction, which sweeps too broadly. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court noted that, on remand, the district court should require an accounting of marginal costs to enable a proper lost-profits calculation. View "Financial Information Technologies, LLC v. iControl Systems, USA, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the conditions of petitioner's supervision program render her "in custody" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2241, such that the district court had jurisdiction to consider her habeas petition. The court also concluded that petitioner did not validly self-execute the 1995 deportation order when, shortly before it was entered, she voluntarily left the United States. Whether the court resolved 8 U.S.C. 1101(g)'s ambiguity through the principle of lenity or through Chevron deference, the court reached the same conclusion: Section 1101(g)'s two conditions operate successively. In this case, petitioner left the Untied States before she was ordered removed and thus she was not "deported or removed" within the meaning of Section 1101(g). Accordingly, the government may lawfully deport her under the still-operative 1995 order. View "Argueta Romero v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of one count of transmitting interstate threats, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 875(c) (Count 1), and three counts of cyberstalking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2261A(2)(B) (Counts 2–4). Defendant's convictions stem from posts he made and messages he sent on Instagram, posing as various mass murderers including notorious serial killer Ted Bundy and Nikolas Cruz, the perpetrator of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting.The court held that 18 U.S.C. 2261A(2)(B) is both facially constitutional and constitutional as applied to defendant's conduct. Finding the First Circuit persuasive, the court declined to employ the "strong medicine" of overbreadth in defendant's constitutional challenge to strike down section 2261A(2)(B). In regard to defendant's as-applied challenge, the court found meritless defendant's contention that his speech was regarding a matter of public concern and that the statute impermissibly restricts the content of his speech. In this case, the messages defendant sent amount to true threats and are therefore not afforded First Amendment protection. The court also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction; the district court did not plainly err in admitting the government's expert testimony; and the court rejected defendant's challenges to the jury instructions. View "United States v. Fleury" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal based on lack of jurisdiction because federal law bars the court from reviewing orders remanding cases based on a defect in removal. In this case, plaintiff moved to remand on the ground that removal was untimely because Travelers had not filed its notice of removal within the one year after commencement of the action. The court also concluded that it would lack jurisdiction even if the order contained some determination of substantive law where the substantive issue would have been intrinsic to the decision to remand. The court explained that, assuming substantive Florida law played a part in the district court's calculation of the removal period, any determination about that law was merely a step towards the conclusion that the removal was untimely. View "Vachon v. Travelers Home and Marine Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Beach, a debtor in possession, sought to avoid Live Oak’s blanket lien on all of its assets. In Florida, a creditor’s financing statement that does not list the debtor’s correct name is “seriously misleading” and ineffective to perfect the creditor’s security interest. Fla. Stat. 679.5061(2). Live Oak asserted that abbreviating “Boulevard” to “Blvd.” did not render the financing statements defective or seriously misleading. Florida Statute 679.5061(3), establishes a safe harbor for defective financing statements. The bankruptcy court granted Live Oak summary judgment.Noting that lower courts, applying Florida law, have reached different conclusions regarding the application of the statutory safe harbor, the Eleventh Circuit certified to the Florida Supreme Court the questions: (1) Is the “search of the records of the filing office under the debtor’s correct name, using the filing office’s standard search logic,” as provided for by Florida Statute 679.5061(3), limited to or otherwise satisfied by the initial page of twenty names displayed to the user of the Registry’s search function? (2) If not, does that search consist of all names in the filing office’s database, which the user can browse to using the command tabs displayed on the initial page? (3) If the search consists of all names in the filing office’s database, are there any limitations on a user’s obligation to review the names and, if so, what factors should courts consider when determining whether a user has satisfied those obligations? View "1944 Beach Boulevard, LLC v. Live Oak Banking Co." on Justia Law