Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, concluding that defendant has forfeited any argument under which the court may grant relief. In this case, defendant alleged that the district court improperly denied his right to self-representation under Faretta v. California. The court concluded that, despite the existence of a circuit split on whether a voluntary guilty plea waives the right to self-representation on appeal and the court's own order to defendant's appellate counsel instructing her to brief whether this court can review a denial of the right to self-representation following a guilty plea, appellate counsel failed to make any argument in the opening brief that even approached the applicable legal question. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit dismissed based on lack of jurisdiction A.B.'s appeal of a declaratory judgment that an insurer has no duty to defend the insured man that sexually abused her. The court explained that the declaratory judgment relieved the insurance company of any obligation to defend the insured which helps, rather than harms, A.B. Furthermore, if A.B. cannot obtain review of the declaratory judgment, it lacks preclusive effect on her. Therefore, A.B. lacks appellate standing as she suffered no injury from the judgment in favor of the insurance company. View "Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. A.B." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Americans with Disabilities lawsuit based on lack of Article III standing, concluding that plaintiff has at least alleged an Article III qualifying stigmatic injury. In this case, plaintiff alleged that she suffered a concrete injury when she viewed a hotel's website that omitted accessibility-related information required by federal regulations and as a result, she says, experienced "frustration and humiliation"—even though she admits that she had (and has) no intention to personally visit the hotel.Despite the absence of a close common-law comparator, the court concluded that under existing precedent plaintiff has alleged a concrete intangible injury. The court explained that plaintiff's allegations satisfy Article III under a narrower reading of Sierra v. City of Hallandale Beach, 996 F.3d 1110 (11th Cir. 2021). Because she claims not only that she suffered illegal discrimination but also that the discrimination resulted in "frustration and humiliation" and a "sense of isolation and segregation," the court concluded that plaintiff has adequately pleaded a concrete stigmatic injury. And because her emotional injury is her emotional injury, it affects her "in a personal and individual way" and is therefore sufficiently particularized. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Laufer v. Arpan LLC" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted Drummond's motion to amend this court's judgment and vacated its prior opinion, substituting it for this opinion. The court denied as moot Southern Coal's petition for rehearing en banc.In this appeal, the court affirmed the district court's judgment against Southern Coal in the amount of $6,860,000 plus $1,473,699.87 in prejudgment interest for a total of $8,333,699.87. The court concluded that the district court correctly found that Southern Coal was not excused from performing under the contract. Furthermore, the court concluded that the district court correctly found the price escalation clause unenforceable. However, the court reversed as to the issue of attorneys' fees, remanding to the district court to award a reasonable sum to the prevailing party, Drummond. View "Southern Coal Corp. v. Drummond Coal Sales, Inc." on Justia Law

After determining that it has appellate jurisdiction and that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's remand of a putative class action to state court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), concluding that the district court erroneously applied the local controversy exception. The court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are Florida citizens. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Simring v. GreenSky, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against University officials, alleging that the University's policy requiring a permit to engage in public speech on the University's sidewalk violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Eleventh Circuit previously concluded, among other things, that plaintiff had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his case and agreed with the district court that the sidewalk at issue is a limited public forum and thus the University's permit requirement needed to be only reasonable and view-point neutral.In this appeal, after careful consideration and with the benefit of oral argument—and even assuming that the City of Tuscaloosa owns the sidewalk at issue—the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with plaintiff that any facts material to its analysis have changed. Accordingly, the court again concluded that the sidewalk is a limited public forum. The court also reviewed the permitting requirement and found that the policy provisions on leafletting were reasonable, and that plaintiff's actions do not fall within the "casual recreational and social activities" exception. The court concluded that the University's advance-notice requirement was reasonable where the University phrases the ten-day advance-notice period in terms of "should," not "must," and the record contains no evidence that the University has rejected an application simply because it was not submitted ten days before the event. Furthermore, the University's reasons for the advance-notice requirement are also reasonable, and the sidewalk is a limited public forum. Moreover, the policy permits the fast-tracking of a permit if an event relates to a current issue or responds to another event. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Keister v. Bell" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that John Doe, a pseudonymous student at Samford University, has not stated a claim against the university for a violation of Title IX, based on a university disciplinary board finding him responsible for sexual assault and suspending him for five years. The court concluded that the alleged facts do not permit a reasonable inference that the university discriminated against Doe "on the basis of sex" where the alleged procedural irregularities do not make sex discrimination plausible; the alleged public pressure and public statements do not make sex discrimination plausible; and the Clery statistics do not change the plausibility of the Title IX claim.The court also concluded that the Title IX claim failed under the Yusuf tests; nor has Doe satisfied the selective enforcement test. Finally, the court concluded that the appeal from the denial of the motion to proceed under a pseudonym is moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the university and dismissed as moot the appeal from the denial of the motion to proceed under a pseudonym. View "Doe v. Samford University" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for cancellation of removal. The court agreed with petitioner that he satisfied his burden of demonstrating his eligibility for cancellation of removal for certain lawful permanent residents because his violation of Fla. Stat. 893.13(6)(a) did not relate to a controlled substance, as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802, and thus did not prevent him from accruing the necessary seven-year period of continuous residence.The court explained that, because a violation of section 893.13(6)(a) did not relate to a controlled substance as defined under federal law, petitioner's conviction under this statute in 2017 did not affect his ability to accrue the required seven years of continuous eligibility necessary for cancellation of removal. Rather, petitioner's residence "clock" stopped in 2019 when he was arrested for fleeing and eluding while lights and sirens were activated. The court explained that, at this point in time, petitioner had lived in the United States continuously for eight years, thereby meeting the residency requirement under INA 240A. View "Fuad Fares Fuad Said v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the 2020 indictment on double jeopardy grounds and therefore affirmed the district court. Defendant was acquitted of solicitation and advertisement for child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(d)(1), but charged with attempting to employ, use, persuade, induce, entice and coerce a person whom he believed to be a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing visual depictions of such conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). Defendant asserts that the district court erred because section 2251(d) does not require proof of any fact beyond what is required for a section 2251(a) conviction. However, the court concluded that section 2251(a) and section 2251(d) each require proof of an additional fact that the other offense does not. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of tipped employees at Nusret, filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), challenging Nusret's compensation scheme. Plaintiffs alleged that from November 1, 2017, through January 18, 2019, the restaurant paid them less than the required federal minimum and overtime wages and forced them to participate in an illegal tip pool with non-tipped employees.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Nusret's mandatory 18% "service charge" is not a tip under the FLSA and associated regulations and could lawfully be used to offset Nusret's wage obligations under the FLSA. The court agreed with the district court that the mandatory service charge was a bona fide service charge and not a tip because it was a compulsory charge for service, and the decision to pay it—and the amount to pay—were not determined solely by the customer. The court declined to reach the merits of plaintiffs' remaining arguments and affirmed the district court's award of summary judgment in favor of Nusret. View "Compere v. Nusret Miami, LLC" on Justia Law