Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute and use a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime. The district court sentenced him to a term of 210 months of imprisonment on the narcotics offense and a consecutive term of 84 months of imprisonment on the firearm offense. Defendant wrote a letter to the district court asking whether he was eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act and requesting the appointment of counsel to file a motion under the Act. Defendant appealed the district court's adverse decision.The court found that Defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. The court reasoned that under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, made retroactive by the First Step Act, a narcotics offense involving less than 28 grams of crack cocaine now carries a statutory penalty of up to 20 years with no mandatory minimum. Thus, because Defendant’s statutory penalty for his crack cocaine offense has been modified by the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act, his conviction is a “covered offense” under Sec. 404(a) of the First Step Act. The court further found that the district court erred when it issued its alternative ruling that Defendant did not merit a reduction of his sentence it did so without hearing from him. Thus, the court reversed the district court’s order denying the construed motion and remanded. View "USA v. Tydearain Smith" on Justia Law

Gulfstream, a Georgia corporation, and Oceltip, an Australian company, entered a sales agreement (“Agreement”). Gulfstream terminated the Agreement after Oceltip failed to pay the full amount or cure a defect within the ten-day cure period.Oceltip submitted a demand for arbitration to the AAA, seeking a finding that Gulfstream had anticipatorily repudiated the Agreement and that this conduct suspended Oceltip’s duties, allowing Oceltip to recoup the money it had paid, and entitled Oceltip to damages. On appeal, Oceltip asserts that federal jurisdiction is lacking. It also argues that the district court erred in confirming the arbitration award and denying vacatur because, in Oceltip’s view, the Georgia Arbitration Code’s standards for vacatur—not the FAA’s—govern, and the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law.First, the court found it has jurisdiction under Sec 203 of the FAA. Next, in resolving the disagreement the court analyzed whether arbitrators’ “manifest disregard of the law” supplies a basis for vacating the award. Under the Georgia Arbitration Code, it does, but federal law—the New York Convention and its implementing statute (Chapter 2 of the FAA)—sets forth seven exclusive grounds for vacatur, which does not include “manifest disregard of the law.” The court concluded that the Agreement’s choice-of-law provision does not supplant federal standards for confirmation or vacatur of an arbitral award, reasoning that the plain meaning of the contractual language does not support Oceltip’s position. Thus, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation v. Oceltip Aviation 1 PTY LTD" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are property owners in Forsyth County who used to rent their homes on a short-term basis. Forsyth County recently amended its Unified Development Code (“UDC”) to prohibit certain property owners from renting their homes on a short-term basis. The amendment includes a grandfathering provision under which a property owner who was engaged in previously lawful activity that is now prohibited may continue to engage in that use. Plaintiffs sought the ability to continue renting their homes on a short-term basis under the amended UDC. The dispute involves determining which of the terms, “owner occupancy,” “rental,” and/or “lease” the phrase “on a weekly, monthly or longer basis” modifies. The court determined that neither the last-antecedent rule nor the series-qualifier canon rule would shed light on the UDC’s meaning. Therefore, the court found that it must discern and apply the ordinary meaning of the terms at issue. Applying ordinary meanings, the court concluded that the prior version of the UDC prohibited short-term rentals.Further, the court disagreed with Plaintiffs’ argument that “[b]ecause the prohibition on ‘rentals’ of less than a week was not explicit in the ordinances, the former UDC[‘s short-term rental ban] was void for vagueness.” The court reasoned that “when the plain text of the statute sets forth clearly perceived boundaries, our inquiry is ended.” Here, the court found that the plain text of the ordinance prohibited short-term rentals, thereby ending the court’s vagueness inquiry. Thus, short-term rentals remain prohibited. View "Kenneth R. Heyman, et al v. Molly Cooper, et al" on Justia Law

Previously, a panel of 11th Circuit judges affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's 42 Sec. 1983 claims under the three-strikes rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). The panel based its decision on precedent holding that a "dismissal for failure to exhaust qualifies as a strike under the PLRA."The court voted, deciding to hear the appeal en banc. Thus, the panel's decision was vacated. View "Jeremy John Wells v. Warden, et al." on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of three misdemeanor counts of willful failure to file a federal income tax return. Defendant was represented by counsel at trial, but he lacked representation during the pretrial process. At his arraignment, Defendant expressed his desire to waive his right to counsel and to represent himself. The magistrate judge found that Defendant’s waiver was knowing, even after misinforming him that the maximum sentence he could receive if convicted was 12 months of imprisonmentThe court found the magistrate judge’s statements were materially incorrect. Instead of “unambiguously” informing Defendant of the penalties he faced, the magistrate judge incorrectly asserted that “we’re not talking about a felony involving imprisonment beyond one year”—when the true maximum sentence was three times longer. Thus, the court held that there was no knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. Next, the court found that the deprivation of Defendant’s right to counsel at all pretrial stages of the proceedings against him was a structural error. As such, the court vacated Defendant’s conviction and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "USA v. Saleem Hakim" on Justia Law

Several young girls were locked out of their social media accounts. Shortly after being locked out, Defendant would contact them, demanding pornographic images. Defendant threatened to release the images to the girls' social media followers if they did not follow his instructions. One of the girls called the police, which eventually led them to Defendant's residence. The officer told Defendant he was not under arrest but that he was investigating a crime. Defendant admitted to taking over about 20 girls' social media accounts and provided details about the involvement of several other men. The district denied Defendant's motion to suppress the statements he made to police. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment followed by a life term of supervised release.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding Defendant was not under arrest at the time he made the statements to the police. The court also affirmed Defendant's sentence, finding it was not procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "USA v. Joseph Isaiah Woodson, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant owns an automobile dealership that operates a service department. When a customer brings a car to Defendant for service, he allows the customer to use a dealership-owned vehicle while the customer’s car is being serviced.The current case arose following an incident when Defendant’s customer was using a loaner vehicle while Defendant was servicing his vehicle. The customer caused an accident with Plaintiff who brought a lawsuit against Defendant for vicarious liability under Florida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine.On appeal, the court reviewed (1) whether Defendant rented or leased the vehicle and (2) whether summary judgment was improper because Defendant used conflicting labels for the vehicle. The relevant portion of the Graves Amendment provides that, generally, a motor vehicle owner who rents or leases the vehicle to a person shall not be liable under the law for harm that results from the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the rental period, if the owner is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner.The court held that Defendant rented or leased the vehicle to the driver and thus enjoys the protection of the Graves Amendment. The extent a rent or lease requires agreed-upon consideration, this exchange had that. Further, the substance of the transaction, not the label used, controls. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant. View "Cindy Thayer v. Randy Marion Chevrolet Buick Cadillac, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy and substantive health care fraud for fraudulently billing Medicare and Medicaid for millions of dollars for visits to nursing home patients that he never made. He challenged the convictions, sentence, restitution amount, and forfeiture amount on appeal.The co-conspirator pleaded guilty to conspiracy and agreed to cooperate with the government. Part of his plea agreement addressed his compensation during the conspiracy. Defendant contends that the district court erred in quashing his subpoena of the co-conspirator’s attorney. The court ruled that any erroneous exclusion of the attorney’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because his testimony would not have impeached the co-conspirator. He further argues that the district court erred in limiting how many character witnesses he could present. The court found that the district court did not err because defendant overstates the importance of character witness testimony in this case. He was not on trial for being uncaring or uncompassionate but for lying and billing Medicare for services he did not provide.Additionally, defendant contends that the district court improperly limited part of his counsel’s closing argument when he was discussing whether defendant had made a profit. The court found that the government does not have to prove a defendant profited to establish the elements of fraud. The court also found that the district court did not err in calculating the loss amount used to determine defendant's sentence or the amount of restitution ordered. View "USA v. Douglas Moss" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were involved in a motor vehicle accident involving a vehicle operated by a USPS employee; through counsel, Plaintiffs submitted a “claim for damage, injury, or death." Subsequently, Plaintiffs retained a new law firm (Pawlowski), and provided notice to the USPS. On September 27, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a Federal Tort Claims Act action against the government and the USPS employee. On October 16, 2018, a copy of the complaint and summons in the first FTCA action was delivered to the government. Another law firm (“Youngblood”), filed the first FTCA action complaint.On October 22, 2018, the USPS mailed a certified letter denying Plaintiffs’ administrative claims to Pawlowski, indicating Plaintiffs had until April 22, 2019 to file suit against the government. Neither Pawlowski nor Youngblood provided the USPS notice of any change in representation. On August 30, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their second FTCA complaint. On March 4, 2020, the government moved for summary judgment, arguing Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred.Plaintiffs contend that the government failed to comply with the plain language of 39 C.F.R. Sec. 912.9(a) when the USPS sent the denial letter to Pawlowski. Further that the district court erred in finding they were not entitled to equitable tolling.The court ruled that the USPS mailed the denial letter to the legal representative who Plaintiffs most recently identified, thus complying with the regulation. Further, the court held that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate entitlement to equitable tolling. The court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment for the government. View "Robert Wayne Dotson, et al. v. USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Iraq War veteran, suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. Two sheriff’s deputies conducted a welfare check after a report that the plaintiff had slit his wrist with a knife. When the deputies arrived, the plaintiff was calm and posed no threat to them. Although the plaintiff expressed his willingness to be arrested, one of the deputies suddenly body-slammed him headfirst, causing a serious neck injury.The Eleventh Circuit held that the deputy had probable cause to seize the plaintiff; therefore, the deputy and supervisor are entitled to qualified immunity from unlawful seizure claims. However, the deputy is not entitled to qualified immunity because the way he did so was excessive. The plaintiff satisfied his burden of proving that the supervisor violated his constitutional right, and the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Therefore, the sheriff's supervisor was not entitled to qualified immunity from the plaintiff’s claim of supervisory liability. Finally, vicarious liability is unavailable under the Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. View "Kirby Ingram v. Louis Kubik, et al." on Justia Law